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We consider the purpose and design of trade agreements in imperfectly competitive environments
featuring firm-delocation effects. In both the segmented-market Cournot and the integrated-market
monopolistic competition settings where these effects have been identified, we show that the only
rationale for a trade agreement is to remedy the inefficiency attributable to the terms-of-trade externality,
the same rationale that arises in perfectly competitive markets. Furthermore, and again as in the perfectly
competitive benchmark case, we show that the principle of reciprocity is efficiency enhancing, as it
serves to "undo" the terms-of-trade driven inefficiency that occurs when governments pursue unilateral
trade policies. Our results therefore indicate that the terms-of-trade theory of trade agreements applies
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A central question in the study of commercial policy is why governments form international trade
agreements. Answers to this question provide the foundation from which to evaluate and interpret
the design of trade agreements in light of the underlying ￿problems￿that they exist to solve.
An established literature argues that governments have a reason to form a trade agreement when
an international externality is associated with their trade-policy choices. When a country is large
in world markets, it can reduce the world (o⁄shore) price of its imported goods by raising its tari⁄s.
The country then enjoys an improvement in its terms of trade; however, its trading partners su⁄er
a negative terms-of-trade externality. As Johnson (1953-54) argues, when governments maximize
national income and markets are perfectly competitive, the associated non-cooperative equilibrium
is ine¢ cient, and a ￿problem￿is thereby identi￿ed. An appropriately designed trade agreement
can then enhance the welfare of all governments by reducing or eliminating this ine¢ ciency.
These arguments are extended by Bagwell and Staiger (1999) and Grossman and Helpman
(1995) to allow that governments have political-economic preferences. Allowing for a wide class of
government preferences, Bagwell and Staiger (1999) demonstrate that the non-cooperative equilib-
rium is ine¢ cient relative to government preferences if and only if governments are motivated by
the terms-of-trade consequences of their respective trade policies. Building from this ￿nding, they
then explore the form that an e¢ ciency-enhancing trade agreement might take. They show that
the principle of reciprocity (and in a multi-country setting, non-discrimination) can help to ￿undo￿
the terms-of-trade driven ine¢ ciency and guide governments toward e¢ cient policies.
A model with perfectly competitive markets o⁄ers a valuable benchmark for understanding the
purpose of trade agreements. In many markets, however, ￿rms possess market power. It is thus
important to know whether the purpose of trade agreements might change in some fundamental
sense once the model is extended to allow for the realistic possibility of imperfect competition.
This extension introduces several novel issues. In particular, as is well known, imperfectly com-
petitive markets can give rise to ￿pro￿t-shifting￿and ￿￿rm-delocation￿e⁄ects that provide novel
motives for trade policy intervention. At a minimum, this suggests that other international exter-
nalities in addition to the terms-of-trade externality may also be present in markets with imperfect
competition.
In this paper, we consider imperfectly competitive markets that feature the ￿rm-delocation
motive for trade policy intervention. In settings where the ￿rm-delocation e⁄ect is present, we
examine the rationale for a trade agreement, and we also consider the form that an e¢ ciency-
enhancing trade agreement might take.
Venables (1985) ￿rst identi￿ed the ￿rm-delocation e⁄ect, according to which an import tari⁄or
export subsidy can produce the surprising result of bene￿ting a country￿ s consumers, by stimulating
entry of domestic ￿rms and thereby reducing domestic prices through enhanced competition. This
bene￿t, however, comes at the expense of foreign consumers, who experience higher prices as a
result of foreign-￿rm exit and diminished competition in the foreign market. Venables identi￿ed
this e⁄ect in a model where ￿rms produce a homogeneous good and compete in a Cournot fashion
1for sales in segmented markets under conditions of free entry. Venables (1987) then showed that
this e⁄ect extends to a setting of free-entry monopolistic competition where markets are integrated
and ￿rms compete to sell di⁄erentiated products. In the model of monopolistic competition used
by Venables, it is the savings on transport costs implied by the ￿rm-delocation e⁄ect rather than
the impacts on competition that can enhance the welfare of the intervening country. As Venables
demonstrates, if the home country raises barriers to its imports or subsidizes its exports, then
foreign ￿rms can be ￿delocated￿to the home market. Home consumers then save on trade costs
in the form of a lower overall price index, at the expense of foreign consumers whose price index
rises.1
When this novel motive for trade policy intervention is present, it might be expected that a
novel rationale for a trade agreement would likewise be present. In line with this expectation, we
show that new international externalities indeed arise when the ￿rm-delocation e⁄ect is present:
in addition to the terms-of-trade externality that travels through the world price, there are also
local price externalities that travel through domestic and foreign local prices. The key question for
our purposes, however, is whether governments internalize these international externalities in an
appropriate fashion from a world-wide perspective when they make their unilateral policy choices.
In both the Cournot and the monopolistic competition settings where the ￿rm-delocation e⁄ect has
been shown to arise, we address this question and establish a surprising answer: the only rationale
for a trade agreement is to remedy the ine¢ ciency attributable to the terms-of-trade externality,
the same rationale that arises in perfectly competitive markets. Furthermore, and again as in the
benchmark model with perfect competition, the principle of reciprocity is e¢ ciency enhancing, as
it serves to ￿undo￿ the terms-of-trade driven ine¢ ciency that occurs when governments pursue
unilateral trade policies.
To establish these results, we characterize the non-cooperative and e¢ cient policy choices, and
we then evaluate the precise reasons for any divergence between them. To this end, we follow
Bagwell and Staiger (1999) and evaluate politically optimal tari⁄s, de￿ned as those tari⁄s that
would hypothetically be chosen by governments unilaterally if they did not value the pure interna-
tional rent-shifting associated with the terms-of-trade movements induced by their unilateral tari⁄
choices. We do this ￿rst for the Cournot model of ￿rm delocation (Section 2) and then for the mo-
nopolistic competition model (Section 3). In each setting, we show that the noncooperative tari⁄s
are ine¢ cient ￿in particular, starting at the noncooperative tari⁄s, both countries could gain by
reducing the total trade impediment on any trade ￿ ow ￿and that the politically optimal tari⁄s
are e¢ cient. We thereby establish that the only rationale for a trade agreement is to remedy the
higher-than-e¢ cient tari⁄s that arise as a consequence of the value that governments place upon
the terms-of-trade movements induced by their unilateral tari⁄ choices.
1More recently, the ￿rm-delocation e⁄ect of trade policy intervention as it arises in a monopolistic competition
setting has been featured in Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2000), Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) and Ossa (2009).
Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud extend the analysis of this e⁄ect to an economic geography setting in which capital is
internationally "footloose," and consider trade liberalization rules that prevent ￿rm-delocation in this setting. Melitz
and Ottaviano extend the analysis of this e⁄ect to a heterogeneous-￿rm setting. Ossa considers the rationale for
trade agreements when ￿rm-delocation e⁄ects are present. We relate our paper further to Ossa￿ s work below.
2We also show that the Cournot and monopolistic competition models exhibit an interesting
and overlooked feature: in each model, the terms-of-trade e⁄ects of import tari⁄s and export taxes
are asymmetric. The asymmetry is most pronounced in the Cournot delocation model. In that
model, a country can in standard fashion improve its terms of trade by levying an import tari⁄;
however, an export tax worsens the terms of trade in the model, contrary to the standard case.
By implication, an export subsidy improves a country￿ s terms of trade in the Cournot delocation
model. This features distinguishes the Cournot delocation model from other models of commercial
policy. The monopolistic competition delocation model that we utilize is similar to that developed
in Helpman and Krugman (1989). As Helpman and Krugman (1989) observe, in this model, a
country is unable to alter its terms of trade by using an import tari⁄. We include export policies
in our analysis as well, however, and observe that a country can generate a somewhat extreme
(dollar-for-dollar) improvement in its terms of trade by applying an export tari⁄.
Our paper is most closely related to the recent paper of Ossa (2009). Utilizing a monopolistic
competition model of ￿rm delocation, Ossa argues that the ￿rm-delocation e⁄ect provides a new
rationale for a trade agreement, and a rationale that is especially relevant for (two-way) trade
between similar countries. Ossa then goes on to o⁄er a novel interpretation of reciprocity and non-
discrimination as simple rules that can neutralize the ￿rm-delocation e⁄ect. Our result concerning
the rationale of a trade agreement in this setting is at odds with Ossa￿ s ￿rst observation, and so it
is important to explore the di⁄erences across the two papers. There are two substantive di⁄erences
between the monopolistic competition model employed by Ossa and the one we utilize below. A ￿rst
di⁄erence is that Ossa allows income e⁄ects on the demand for di⁄erentiated products, while our
(quasi linear) speci￿cation of utility ensures that there will be no such income e⁄ects. The second
di⁄erence is related to the ￿rst: due to income e⁄ects, Ossa￿ s model becomes intractable when trade
taxes imply revenue, and so Ossa assumes that trade taxes do not have revenue consequences; and
importantly, this assumption requires Ossa to abstract from export (subsidy) policies in his analysis.
By contrast, the revenue consequences of trade taxes are simple to handle in our quasi-linear setting,
and so we can and do allow for both import tari⁄s and export taxes/subsidies; and as we explain
below, allowing for both import and export policies is crucial for our result.2
How can the problem for a trade agreement to solve still amount to providing an avenue of
escape from a terms-of-trade driven Prisoners￿Dilemma when, as we have noted above and con￿rm
below, the presence of the ￿rm-delocation e⁄ect introduces new international externalities that
are transmitted through non-terms-of-trade channels? Broadly speaking, the reason is this: trade
agreements do not expand the set of feasible policy instruments available to governments, and
so any e¢ ciency gains generated by a trade agreement must derive from changes in the level of
intervention achieved with the existing policy instruments; and as we demonstrate, even in this
more complicated environment it is the international rent-shifting/cost-shifting associated with the
2The GATT/WTO restricts the use of export subsidies, and in this light Ossa￿ s (2009) ￿nding can be interpreted
as characterizing a problem that arises when export subsidies are banned. At the same time, this interpretation
would fall short of delivering a fundamental rationale for a trade agreement, because it appeals to the existence of a
trade agreement (on export subsidies) to explain why governments need a trade agreement.
3terms-of-trade externality ￿and this externality alone ￿that accounts for the ine¢ cient level of
intervention under unilateral policy choices.
In what follows, we maintain the assumption that free entry eliminates pro￿ts in equilibrium
even though ￿rms are not price-takers. This allows us to focus on the ￿rm-delocation e⁄ect, and
on the novel role for trade policy intervention in the presence of this e⁄ect. An alternative role
for government intervention can arise when the number of producers in each country is ￿xed and
invariant to trade policy. In this case, there may exist pro￿table ￿rms, and the pursuit of those
pro￿ts ￿either converted into tari⁄revenue or shifted from one ￿rm to another ￿combined with the
relaxation of the assumption of price-taking behavior can provide an alternative ￿pro￿t shifting￿
role for trade policy intervention. In a companion paper (Bagwell and Staiger, 2009), we consider
this alternative by exploring models in which ￿rms are not price takers but where the number of
￿rms is ￿xed, and we again ask whether a novel role for trade agreements can be identi￿ed. For the
models of pro￿t-shifting, our main ￿nding is again that the terms-of-trade externality continues to
provide the only rationale for a trade agreement.
2 Delocation with Cournot Competition and Segmented Markets
In this section we consider a model whose underlying structure is essentially that contained in
Venables (1985).3 We refer to this model as the Cournot delocation model. The industry under
consideration is comprised of ￿rms who produce a homogeneous good and compete in a Cournot
fashion for sales in a domestic and foreign market under conditions of free entry. The markets are
segmented, and two-way trade in identical products arises as a consequence. There are transport
costs between the markets, and each government may also impose a trade tax/subsidy on trade ￿ ows
in and/or out of its market. This environment exhibits a ￿rm-delocation e⁄ect that has important
implications for the impacts of trade policy, as Venables ￿rst emphasized. Our main purpose here,
however, is to identify and interpret the sources of ine¢ ciency that arise when governments set
their trade policies unilaterally, and thereby to explore the potential role and design of a trade
agreement in this environment.
2.1 Model Setup
There are two countries (home and foreign), each endowed with a large amount of labor which
is the only factor of production. In the background, a competitively supplied numeraire good is
produced with labor alone according to a constant-returns-to-scale production function common
across countries (1 unit of labor produces 1 unit of the numeraire). The numeraire good enters
linearly into the utility of each country, is always produced and consumed in positive amounts
by each country (due to the large supply of labor in each country), and is freely traded across
countries, so that its price (and hence the wage of labor) is ￿xed and equalized (and normalized to
3The model we develop here imposes additional symmetry across countries relative to Venables (1985), but this
symmetry serves only to simplify the exposition and is not necessary for our main results.
4one) everywhere in the world. This structure permits a partial equilibrium treatment of the second,
imperfectly competitive, industry that is our main focus. The home country has nh Cournot ￿rms
in this industry, and the foreign country has nf Cournot ￿rms, all producing the same good at a
(common) marginal cost c and ￿xed cost F under conditions of free entry. If the good sells in the
home country at price P, then home consumers demand D(P) units; likewise, if the good sells in
the foreign country at price P￿, then foreign consumers demand D￿(P￿) units. We assume that
D(P) and D￿(P￿) are positive and downward sloping.
The markets are segmented, so that the home and foreign market prices P and P￿ are determined
by separate home and foreign market-clearing conditions, and the problem of output choice for each
￿rm is separable across the home and foreign markets. As shown by Brander (1981), an implication
of the segmented markets setting is that in general trade will occur in both directions.4 Trade in
either direction is costly in this industry, and we let ’ denote the cost of transporting one unit of
the good between countries (measured in units of the numeraire). We assume that each country
has both import and export policies at its disposal, and we express all trade taxes in speci￿c terms:
for exports from the home country to the foreign country, t￿
h is the export tax imposed by the home
country (t￿
h < 0 if an export subsidy) and t￿
f is the import tari⁄ imposed by the foreign country;
and for exports from the foreign country to the home country, tf is the export tax imposed by
the foreign country (tf < 0 if an export subsidy) and th is the import tari⁄ imposed by the home
country. We maintain a focus throughout on non-prohibitive trade taxes.
For convenience we de￿ne the total trade impediments facing home and foreign imports, re-
spectively, by
￿ ￿ ’ + th + tf; and (1)
￿￿ ￿ ’ + t￿
h + t￿
f:
In what follows, we assume the existence of positive transport costs so that ’ > 0, implying that
under free-trade policies (th = 0, tf = 0, t￿
h = 0, t￿
f = 0) we have ￿ > 0 and ￿￿ > 0. In e⁄ect
as will become clear, this assumption ensures that, beginning from free trade, a ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts are
more sensitive to changes in the price it receives for its domestic sales than for its export sales.
As discussed in Venables (1985), it is this feature that delivers the ￿rm-delocation e⁄ects of trade
policy exhibited by the model.
Consider next the problem faced by home ￿rm i. For ￿xed nh and nf, home ￿rm i must
choose output destined for the home market qi
h to maximize its home-market pro￿t in light of
the (nh ￿ 1) other (symmetric) home ￿rms￿home-market output choices (nh ￿ 1)qh and the nf
(symmetric) foreign ￿rms￿home-market output choices nfqf. The industry output destined for
the home market is Q ￿ qi
h + (nh ￿ 1)qh + nfqf, and Q then determines P through the home
4For analyses of trade policies in the presence of segmented markets with an exogenously ￿xed number of ￿rms,
see Brander and Spencer (1984) and Dixit (1984). For an analysis of trade agreements in the segmented-market-
￿xed-number-of-￿rms setting, see Bagwell and Staiger (2009).
5market-clearing condition
qi
h + (nh ￿ 1)qh + nfqf = D(P): (2)
Home ￿rm i must also choose output destined for the foreign market qi￿
h to maximize its foreign-
market pro￿t in light of the (nh￿1) other (symmetric) home ￿rms￿foreign output choices (nh￿1)q￿
h
and the nf (symmetric) foreign ￿rms￿foreign output choices nfq￿
f. The industry output destined
for the foreign market Q￿ ￿ qi￿
h + (nh ￿ 1)q￿
h + nfq￿
f then determines P￿ through the foreign
market-clearing condition
qi￿
h + (nh ￿ 1)q￿
h + nfq￿
f = D￿(P￿): (3)





f), or equivalently P(Q) and P￿(Q￿). Notice that,
owing to the segmented market assumption, P and P￿ do not depend on trade taxes directly, but
may depend indirectly on trade taxes to the extent that trade taxes alter respectively Q and Q￿.






h + (nh ￿ 1)qh + nfqf) ￿ c]qi
h
+[P￿(qi￿
h + (nh ￿ 1)q￿
h + nfq￿
f) ￿ (c + ￿￿)]qi￿
h ￿ F:
For each market, home ￿rm i0s ￿rst-order condition equates the marginal revenue generated from a
slight increase in its output in that market with its marginal cost of delivery to that market. Using
(2) to derive dP
dQ = 1
D0(P) and using (3) to derive dP￿
dQ￿ = 1
D￿0(P￿), these ￿rst-order conditions can be
expressed as
qi
h + [P(￿) ￿ c]D0(P(￿)) = 0; and (4)
qi￿
h + [P￿(￿) ￿ (c + ￿￿)]D￿0(P￿(￿)) = 0;
where we use P(￿) to denote P(qi




to reduce notation. These conditions de￿ne home-￿rm i0s reaction curve for the home and foreign
markets, respectively.5 Under our assumption that demand functions are downward sloping, we
may observe from (4) that home ￿rm i￿ s markups (inclusive of trade costs) must be positive in both
markets.











f + (nf ￿ 1)qf + nhqh) ￿ (c + ￿)]qi
f ￿ F:
As before, in each market, foreign ￿rm i0s ￿rst-order condition equates the marginal revenue gen-






￿(￿) ￿ (c + ￿
￿)]D
￿00(P
￿(￿)), and they are sure to hold, for example, if the demand functions
D(P) and D
￿(P
￿) are log concave.
6erated from a slight increase in its output in that market with its marginal cost of delivery to that
market. These ￿rst-order conditions can be expressed as
qi￿
f + [P￿(￿) ￿ c]D￿0(P￿(￿)) = 0; and (5)
qi
f + [P(￿) ￿ (c + ￿)]D0(P(￿)) = 0:
These conditions de￿ne foreign-￿rm i0s reaction curve for the foreign and home markets, respec-
tively.6 Again, given our assumption that demand functions are downward sloping, we see from (5)
that foreign ￿rm i￿ s markups (inclusive of trade costs) must be positive in both markets.
Finally, when all home and foreign ￿rms are on their respective reaction curves, we have the
Cournot-Nash equilibrium. After imposing symmetry across home ￿rms (qi
h = qh and qi￿
h = q￿
h)
and across foreign ￿rms (qi
f = qf and qi￿
f = q￿
f), we may solve for the home-market output levels
for a representative home ￿rm and a representative foreign ￿rm. We denote these Nash quantities
in the home market by qN
h (nh;nf;￿) and qN
f (nh;nf;￿), respectively, with QN(nh;nf;￿) ￿ nhqN
h +
nfqN
f . Similarly, we may solve for the foreign-market output levels for a representative home
￿rm and a representative foreign ￿rm. We denote these Nash quantities in the foreign market by
q￿N
h (nh;nf;￿￿) and q￿N
f (nh;nf;￿￿), respectively, with Q￿N(nh;nf;￿￿) ￿ nhq￿N
h + nfq￿N
f . We also
impose the condition
qN
f P00(QN) + P0(QN) < 0 and q￿N
h P￿00(Q￿N) + P￿0(Q￿N) < 0; (6)
which ensures that a ￿rm￿ s marginal revenue falls in a market when other ￿rms￿output increases
in that market, and amounts to an assumption that reaction curves are downward sloping.7
For a broad family of demand functions (including linear demands), when nh and nf are held
￿xed an increase in ￿ reduces the sales of each foreign ￿rm into the home market, qN
f (nh;nf;￿),
raises the sales of each home ￿rm in the home market, qN
h (nh;nf;￿), and reduces total sales in
the home market QN(nh;nf;￿), with P(QN(nh;nf;￿)) rising but by less than ￿.8 And similarly,
with nh and nf held ￿xed, an increase in ￿￿ reduces the sales of each home ￿rm into the foreign
market, q￿N
h (nh;nf;￿￿), raises the sales of each foreign ￿rm in the foreign market, q￿N
f (nh;nf;￿￿),
and reduces total sales in the foreign market Q￿N(nh;nf;￿￿), with P￿(Q￿N(nh;nf;￿￿)) rising but
by less than ￿￿. We henceforth assume that these properties hold.
We may now write the maximized pro￿ts of a representative home ￿rm as
￿h(nh;nf;￿￿;￿) = [P(QN(nh;nf;￿)) ￿ c]qN
h (nh;nf;￿) (7)
+[P￿(Q￿N(nh;nf;￿￿)) ￿ (c + ￿￿)]q￿N
h (nh;nf;￿￿) ￿ F:
6We again assume that the second-order conditions hold.
7Condition (6) clearly holds when demand is linear. More generally, condition (6) is ensured if the demand
functions D(P) and D
￿(P
￿) are log concave.
8For the linear-demand case, see, for example, Bagwell and Staiger (2009a). We note that, for su¢ ciently convex
demand functions, an increase in ￿ may induce P(Q
N(nh;nf;￿)) to rise by more than ￿, when nh and nf are held
￿xed. We abstract from such demand functions here.
7And similarly, we may write the maximized pro￿ts of a representative foreign ￿rm as
￿f(nh;nf;￿￿;￿) = [P￿(Q￿N(nh;nf;￿￿)) ￿ c]q￿N
f (nh;nf;￿￿) (8)
+[P(QN(nh;nf;￿)) ￿ (c + ￿)]qN
f (nh;nf;￿) ￿ F:
We assume that ￿h(nh;nf;￿￿;￿) and ￿f(nh;nf;￿￿;￿) are each decreasing in nh and nf. This
assumption holds for a broad family of demand functions (including linear demands).
Under free entry, nh and nf adjust to ensure that the maximized pro￿ts of home and foreign
￿rms de￿ned in (7) and (8) respectively are equal to zero, or
￿h(nh;nf;￿￿;￿) = 0 = ￿f(nh;nf;￿￿;￿); (9)
which then de￿nes nN
h (￿￿;￿) and nN
f (￿￿;￿). Our focus on non-prohibitive trade taxes ensures that
both nN
h (￿￿;￿) and nN
f (￿￿;￿) are positive, but condition (9) ignores the fact that nh and nf can
only take on integer values. Nevertheless, we will follow standard practice and treat nN
h (￿￿;￿) and
nN
f (￿￿;￿) as continuous and di⁄erentiable functions, which is a good approximation if the number
of ￿rms is large.
We assume that nN
h (￿￿;￿) is increasing in ￿ and decreasing in ￿￿ while nN
f (￿￿;￿) is increasing in
￿￿ and decreasing in ￿. This assumption holds if the determinant of the Jacobian matrix associated
with (9) is positive; for example, it is straightforward to verify that this assumption holds when
demand is linear. Intuitively, under our assumptions, an increase in ￿ with nh and nf held ￿xed
will result in positive pro￿ts for home ￿rms and negative pro￿ts for foreign ￿rms. The equilibrium
zero-pro￿t condition in (9) can then be restored if foreign ￿rms exit (nN
f falls) and home ￿rms
enter (nN
h rises). Similarly, an increase in ￿￿ with nh and nf held ￿xed will result in positive pro￿ts
for foreign ￿rms and negative pro￿ts for home ￿rms, and the equilibrium zero-pro￿t condition in
(9) can then be re-established if home ￿rms exit (nN
h falls) and foreign ￿rms enter (nN
f rises). As
we will illustrate shortly, the changes in nN
h and nN
f induced by changes in tari⁄s underlie the
￿rm-delocation e⁄ects of trade policy intervention featured in this model.
Finally, using nN
h (￿￿;￿) and nN
f (￿￿;￿), we may write the home and foreign market prices re-
spectively as
~ PN(￿￿;￿) ￿ P(QN(nN
h (￿￿;￿);nN
f (￿￿;￿);￿)); and (10)
~ P￿N(￿￿;￿) ￿ P￿(Q￿N(nN
h (￿￿;￿);nN
f (￿￿;￿);￿￿)):
Similarly, we may write the home and foreign market sales of a representative home and foreign
8￿rm as
~ qN



















According to (10) and (11), all Nash equilibrium prices and quantities can be expressed as functions
of the total trade impediments ￿￿ and ￿.
2.2 The Firm-Delocation E⁄ect
At this point, we evaluate the impacts of tari⁄s on the Nash local prices ~ PN(￿￿;￿) and ~ P￿N(￿￿;￿),
and thereby further highlight the importance of the ￿rm-delocation e⁄ect. To this end, we substitute
(4) into (7) and (5) into (8) to rewrite (9) as
[P(￿) ￿ c]2[￿D0(P(￿))] + [P￿(￿) ￿ (c + ￿￿)]2[￿D￿0(P￿(￿))] ￿ F = 0; and (12)
[P￿(￿) ￿ c]2[￿D￿0(P￿(￿))] + [P(￿) ￿ (c + ￿)]2[￿D0(P(￿))] ￿ F = 0;
where with a slight abuse of notation we now use P(￿) to denote P(QN(nh;nf;￿)) and P￿(￿) to
denote P￿(Q￿N(nh;nf;￿￿)). The top equation in (12) traces out a locus of home and foreign prices
(P and P￿) that, for any ￿￿, is consistent with the home-￿rm zero-pro￿t condition; similarly, the
bottom equation of (12) traces out a locus of home and foreign prices that, for any ￿, is consistent
with the foreign-￿rm zero-pro￿t condition. Di⁄erent values of nh and nf trace out the locus of
(P;P￿) combinations described by each of the two equations in (12), and the equilibrium values
nN
h (￿￿;￿) and nN
f (￿￿;￿) ￿and hence ~ PN(￿￿;￿) and ~ P￿N(￿￿;￿) ￿are determined where the two loci
cross and hence the two equations in (12) are satis￿ed.
Di⁄erentiating each equation in (12) with respect to P and P￿ and solving for dP
dP￿j￿h=0 and
dP
dP￿j￿f=0, it is straightforward to establish that each locus of (P;P￿) combinations is negatively
sloped under the second-order conditions. Moreover, using (6), it can be shown that at the equilib-
rium point the foreign-￿rm zero-pro￿t condition is steeper than the home-￿rm zero-pro￿t condition
(i.e., dP
dP￿j￿f=0 < dP
dP￿j￿h=0 < 0) as long as ￿ > 0 and ￿￿ > 0, which is guaranteed beginning from
free-trade policies (th = 0, tf = 0, t￿
h = 0, t￿
f = 0) under our assumption of positive transport costs
(’ > 0).
Starting with an initial set of policies, such as the free-trade policies, at which ￿ > 0 and ￿￿ > 0,
consider now the impact of a small increase in ￿, triggered by an increase in either th or tf. Figure
1 illustrates. With P on the vertical axis and P￿ on the horizontal axis, the solid lines labelled
￿h
0 = 0 and ￿
f
0 = 0 depict, respectively, the home-￿rm and foreign-￿rm zero pro￿t loci described
by (12) under the initial policies. As discussed above, with positive transport costs, the two loci
cross as depicted in the ￿gure, with the ￿
f
0 = 0 locus cutting the ￿h
0 = 0 locus from above, and
9the point at which they cross corresponds to an initial equilibrium price combination denoted in
the ￿gure by ~ PN
0 and ~ P￿N
0 . As can be con￿rmed from (12), a small increase in ￿ triggered by an
increase in either th or tf leaves the ￿h = 0 locus una⁄ected, but it shifts out the ￿f = 0 locus.9 In
Figure 1, this new locus is depicted by the dashed line and labeled ￿
f
1 = 0, and the new equilibrium
prices are denoted by ~ PN
1 and ~ P￿N
1 .
Recall that, with nh and nf held ￿xed, P(QN(nh;nf;￿)) rises when ￿ is increased but by less
than the rise in ￿, while P￿(Q￿N(nh;nf;￿￿)) is una⁄ected. To restore zero-pro￿ts for both home
and foreign ￿rms, there must be entry of home ￿rms (nh must rise) and exit of foreign ￿rms (nf
must fall); and as Figure 1 illustrates, the competitive e⁄ects of this entry and exit must be su¢ cient
to ensure that ~ PN(￿￿;￿) ultimately falls and ~ P￿N(￿￿;￿) ultimately rises. In other words, a small
increase in ￿ results in a pro-competitive (entry) e⁄ect which reduces the price in the home market
and an anti-competitive (exit) e⁄ect which raises the price in the foreign market. A corresponding
analysis establishes that a small increase in ￿￿, triggered by an increase in either t￿
h or t￿
f, will
decrease ~ P￿N(￿￿;￿) and increase ~ PN(￿￿;￿).
These surprising price impacts of tari⁄ intervention are the hallmark of the ￿rm-delocation
e⁄ect. As Venables (1985) emphasizes, these impacts arise when trade costs are positive, since a
￿rm then has greater sales in its domestic market than abroad, all else equal, and so adjustments
in the domestic price bear the primary burden for restoring zero pro￿ts following any trade policy
intervention. As Venables (1985) establishes, the ￿rm-delocation e⁄ect gives rise to a novel motive
for trade policy intervention: an import tari⁄ or export subsidy can bene￿t a country￿ s consumers,
by stimulating entry of domestic ￿rms and thereby reducing domestic prices through enhanced
competition; this bene￿t, however, comes at the expense of foreign consumers, who experience
higher prices as a result of foreign-￿rm exit and diminished competition in the foreign market. We
next introduce a complete representation of welfare, so that we may explore the implications of the
￿rm-delocation e⁄ect for optimal unilateral trade policy choices and the nature of trade agreements.
2.3 Representation of Welfare
To proceed, we now develop expressions for the welfare of each country. We begin with the home
welfare function. Because the free-entry condition (9) ensures that oligopoly pro￿ts are zero, we
can write home welfare as the sum of consumer surplus and net trade tax revenue, or






where we note that nN
f ~ qN
f corresponds to home-country imports and nN
h ~ q￿N
h corresponds to home-
country exports. To re￿ne the expression for home welfare, we next introduce a number of further
price de￿nitions.
First, at the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, let us denote the world price for exports to the home
9This follows from the second-order conditions.
10market by
~ PwN(th;￿￿;￿) = ~ PN(￿￿;￿) ￿ th (13)
and the world price for exports to the foreign market by
~ P￿wN(t￿
f;￿￿;￿) = ~ P￿N(￿￿;￿) ￿ t￿
f: (14)
We also de￿ne ~ RN(￿￿;￿) = ~ P￿wN(t￿
f;￿￿;￿) ￿ ’ ￿ t￿
h as the price received by the home ￿rm for
foreign sales (the segmentation of markets implies that in general ~ RN 6= ~ PN), and similarly
~ R￿N(￿￿;￿) = ~ PwN(th;￿￿;￿) ￿ ’ ￿ tf as the price received by the foreign ￿rm for home-country
sales (the segmentation of markets implies that in general ~ R￿N 6= ~ P￿N). Notice using (1) that
~ PN ￿ ~ R￿N = ￿ and ~ P￿N ￿ ~ RN = ￿￿. We may thus regard the equilibrium numbers of ￿rms de￿ned
in (9) and hence the Cournot-Nash quantities de￿ned in (11) as functions of local price di⁄erences.
With these observations in place, we now represent home-country imports M and exports E
respectively as
M( ~ P￿N ￿ ~ RN; ~ PN ￿ ~ R￿N) = nN
f ( ~ P￿N ￿ ~ RN; ~ PN ￿ ~ R￿N)~ qN
f ( ~ P￿N ￿ ~ RN; ~ PN ￿ ~ R￿N); and
E( ~ P￿N ￿ ~ RN; ~ PN ￿ ~ R￿N) = nN
h ( ~ P￿N ￿ ~ RN; ~ PN ￿ ~ R￿N)~ q￿N
h ( ~ P￿N ￿ ~ RN; ~ PN ￿ ~ R￿N);
allowing home country welfare to be expressed as a direct function of prices:
W( ~ PN; ~ RN; ~ PwN; ~ P￿N; ~ R￿N; ~ P￿wN) = CS( ~ PN) (15)
+[ ~ PN ￿ ~ PwN]M( ~ P￿N ￿ ~ RN; ~ PN ￿ ~ R￿N)
+[ ~ P￿wN ￿ ~ RN ￿ ’]E( ~ P￿N ￿ ~ RN; ~ PN ￿ ~ R￿N):
Next consider the foreign welfare function. Foreign welfare is given by the sum of consumer
surplus and net trade tax revenue, or






We may therefore represent foreign country welfare by
W￿( ~ P￿N; ~ R￿N; ~ P￿wN; ~ PN; ~ RN; ~ PwN) = CS￿( ~ P￿N) (16)
+[ ~ PwN ￿ ~ R￿N ￿ ’]M( ~ P￿N ￿ ~ RN; ~ PN ￿ ~ R￿N)
+[ ~ P￿N ￿ ~ P￿wN]E( ~ P￿N ￿ ~ RN; ~ PN ￿ ~ R￿N):
Hence, by (15) and (16), we may express the welfare of each country as a function of home and
foreign local prices and the terms of trade (as re￿ ected in the two world prices).
Notice an interesting feature of the Cournot delocation model: the terms-of-trade e⁄ects of
import tari⁄s and export taxes are asymmetric. To see this, consider ￿rst the impact of an increase
in the home import tari⁄ th on the world prices ~ PwN and ~ P￿wN. Using the de￿nitions of the world
11prices given in (13) and (14), we have d ~ PwN
dth = @ ~ PwN
@th + @ ~ PwN
@￿ = @ ~ PN
@￿ ￿1 < 0 and d ~ P￿wN
dth = @ ~ P￿wN
@￿ =
@ ~ P￿N
@￿ > 0, and hence the home import tari⁄ improves the home terms of trade by lowering the
world price of home imports and raising the world price of home exports. An analogous statement
holds for the foreign import tari⁄. The terms-of-trade e⁄ect of an import tari⁄ in the Cournot
delocation model is thus the standard e⁄ect expected from competitive models for a country that
is large in world markets, and this provides a second motive (in addition to ￿rm delocation) for
import tari⁄s in the model: international cost-shifting.10
Now consider the impact of an increase in the home export tax t￿
h on the world prices ~ PwN
and ~ P￿wN. In this case we have d ~ PwN
dt￿
h
= @ ~ PwN
@￿￿ = @ ~ PN
@￿￿ > 0 and d ~ P￿wN
dt￿
h
= @ ~ P￿wN
@￿￿ = @ ~ P￿N
@￿￿ < 0, and
hence, contrary to the standard e⁄ect in competitive models, the home export tax worsens the
home terms of trade by raising the world price of home imports and lowering the world price of
home exports. Again an analogous statement holds for the foreign export tax. Intuitively, a home
export tax worsens the home terms-of-trade because of the domestic exit and foreign entry that
the export tax induces: as noted above in section 2.2, the anti-competitive e⁄ect of the domestic
exit induced by the home export tax is su¢ cient to raise the price for sales in the home market,
which must be paid for home imports; and the pro-competitive e⁄ect of the induced foreign entry
is su¢ cient to lower the price for sales in the foreign market, which home ￿rms receive for their
exports.
The terms-of-trade e⁄ect of an export tax in the Cournot delocation model is thus opposite
the standard e⁄ect expected from competitive models for a country that is large in world markets.
By implication, an export subsidy improves a country￿ s terms of trade, and this provides a second
motive (in addition to ￿rm delocation) for export subsidies in the model, namely, international
cost-shifting.11
At this point it is useful to pause and compare the expressions for welfare in (15) and (16)
with the expressions that arise in a perfectly competitive (integrated markets) benchmark setting.
Under conditions of perfect competition in this single-good setting, each country￿ s welfare can be
expressed as a function of its local price (P or P￿) and the world price (Pw), so that home country
welfare can be written as W(P;Pw) and foreign country welfare can be written as W￿(P￿;Pw).12
Compared to the perfectly competitive benchmark, the presence of segmented markets is one
reason for the proliferation of prices in the expressions for welfare in (15) and (16). When markets
are segmented, identical products may trade in two directions. If the con￿guration of tari⁄s (or
transport costs) is di⁄erent along one direction of trade than the other, then the associated world
prices may di⁄er as well. Thus, we may have that ~ PwN 6= ~ P￿wN. The segmentation of markets also
implies that in general the price that a ￿rm receives for a unit destined for export may di⁄er from
the price that it receives when the unit is sold locally. In other words, when markets are segmented,
we generally have that ~ RN 6= ~ PN and ~ R￿N 6= ~ P￿N. But the home and foreign welfare expressions in
10Speci￿cally, some of the tari⁄ revenue is being collected from foreigners.
11Speci￿cally, foreigners are paying for some of the subsidy to domestic exporters.
12See Bagwell and Staiger (1999, 2001, 2002) on the general validity of this structure and its importance for trade
agreements.
12(15) and (16) reveal a further and crucial distinction between the perfectly competitive benchmark
and the setting we consider here: in the present setting, each country￿ s welfare depends not only
upon its own local prices and the world prices, but also on the local prices that prevail in the
markets of its trading partner. This is because it is the di⁄erence between local prices at home and
abroad that determines Nash equilibrium trade volumes and therefore trade tax revenues.
Hence, as (15) and (16) con￿rm, there is a new international externality present for each gov-
ernment as compared to the competitive benchmark setting: for the home government, in addition
to the terms-of-trade externalities that travel through ~ PwN and ~ P￿wN, there are also (foreign)
local price externalities that run through ~ R￿N and ~ P￿N; and similarly, for the foreign government,
in addition to the terms-of-trade externalities that travel through ~ PwN and ~ P￿wN, there are also
(home-country) local price externalities that run through ~ RN and ~ PN. This indicates a more com-
plex international policy environment than exists under the competitive benchmark, and it raises
the possibility that the task of a trade agreement may be more complicated in this environment
as a result. Nevertheless, the fundamental question for our purposes here is whether governments
would make unilateral policy choices that internalize these international externalities ￿whatever
form these externalities might take ￿in an appropriate fashion from a world-wide perspective, and
if not, why not. To answer this question, we need to examine the non-cooperative and e¢ cient
policy choices in detail and evaluate the precise reasons for any divergence between them.
2.4 Nash Policies and Ine¢ ciency
We next characterize the Nash policy choices, which we interpret to be those policies that govern-
ments would choose in the absence of a trade agreement. Using (15) and the fact that d￿
dth = 1 = d￿￿
dt￿
h
by (1), the ￿rst-order conditions that de￿ne the optimal unilateral policy choices for the home coun-
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@ ~ P￿N
@￿
+ W ~ R￿N
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@￿￿ + W ~ PwN
@ ~ PwN
@￿￿ + W ~ P￿N
@ ~ P￿N
@￿￿ + W ~ R￿N
@ ~ R￿N
@￿￿ + W ~ P￿wN
@ ~ P￿wN
@￿￿ = 0. (18)
Similarly, using (16) and the fact that d￿￿
dt￿
f
= 1 = d￿
dtf by (1), the ￿rst-order conditions that de￿ne















































13We assume that second-order conditions are met.
14Again we assume that second-order conditions are met.




f , are de￿ned by the solution to these
four ￿rst-order conditions.
Beginning from free trade and under our assumption of positive transport costs, it can be
shown that each country gains when it imposes a small import tari⁄ and/or a small export sub-
sidy.15 Intuitively, as we have observed, there are two reinforcing motives in the model that drive
governments to restrict imports with import tari⁄s and to promote exports with export subsidies:
a ￿rm-delocation motive, whereby each government seeks to reduce the prices faced by consumers
in its local market; and a terms-of-trade motive, whereby each government can shift some of the
costs of its intervention on to foreigners. In light of these motives, it might seem natural to expect
that the Nash policies characterized by (17) through (20) would then involve each country taxing
its imports and subsidizing its exports. In Bagwell and Staiger (2009a), however, we focus on the
case of linear demand and identify a further consideration: a tari⁄-complementarity e⁄ect exists
for any country between its import and export tari⁄s. Intuitively, when a country raises its import
tari⁄, the resulting ￿rm-delocation e⁄ect generates entry and thus expanded export volume. From
the perspective of trade tax revenue, this makes an export subsidy less attractive and an export
tax more attractive. For the linear-demand case, we show in Bagwell and Staiger (2009a) that
the tari⁄-complementarity e⁄ect is su¢ ciently strong to ensure that the Nash equilibrium entails
a positive import tari⁄ and an export tax. More generally, while it can be expected that the Nash
import policy is an import tari⁄ in this model, the sign of the Nash export policy is di¢ cult to pin
down without imposing additional assumptions on the model. In what follows, we therefore make
no assumptions on the signs (taxes or subsidies) of Nash policies.
In any event, we now con￿rm the ine¢ ciency of the Nash policy choices. As a preliminary
step, we characterize e¢ cient policy choices. An e¢ cient or joint-welfare maximizing agreement
would maximize the sum of W and W￿. Notice from (15) and (16), though, that the world prices
( ~ PwN and ~ P￿wN) cancel from this summation: the world price a⁄ects the distribution of rents
across countries, but does not in itself a⁄ect e¢ ciency. This observation provides one simple way of
understanding why tari⁄policies that are motivated by terms-of-trade e⁄ects lead to ine¢ ciencies.16
But we may still ask whether any other sources of ine¢ ciency are present. To this end, we express
joint welfare as
J( ~ PN; ~ RN; ~ P￿N; ~ R￿N) ￿ W( ~ PN; ~ RN; ~ PwN; ~ P￿N; ~ R￿N; ~ P￿wN) + W￿( ~ P￿N; ~ R￿N; ~ P￿wN; ~ PN; ~ RN; ~ PwN)
= CS( ~ PN) + [ ~ PN ￿ ~ R￿N ￿ ’]M( ~ P￿N ￿ ~ RN; ~ PN ￿ ~ R￿N) +
[ ~ P￿N ￿ ~ RN ￿ ’]E( ~ P￿N ￿ ~ RN; ~ PN ￿ ~ R￿N) + CS￿( ~ P￿N):
15See Venables (1985) for a demonstration of this point. Venables does not, however, characterize the Nash
equilibrium policies, which we discuss next.
16Further support for this understanding emerges if we consider the external e⁄ect of a change in a country￿ s trade
policies on the welfare of its trading partner, when we initially position all trade policies at their Nash levels. In
particular, we may use (17), (18) and (15) to establish that dW=dtf = W ~ PwN = ￿M < 0 and dW=dt
￿
f = ￿W ~ P￿wN =
￿E < 0, where all expressions are evaluated at Nash trade policies. Thus, at the Nash equilibrium, an increase in the
foreign export or import tari⁄ imposes a negative externality on domestic welfare, and it does so only through the
induced change in the terms of trade. Using (19), (20) and (16), we may establish an exactly analogous conclusion
with regard to the e⁄ect of a change in domestic trade policies on foreign country welfare.
14Using the expression for joint welfare above, and noting that ~ PN, ~ RN, ~ P￿N and ~ R￿N are each
functions of ￿ and ￿￿ only ￿and hence only functions of the total tari⁄s t￿
h + t￿
f and th + tf ￿it
follows that there are only two independent conditions that de￿ne e¢ cient choices of th, t￿
h, tf and
t￿
f, and they are given by

















[W ~ PN +W￿
~ PN]
@ ~ PN
@￿￿ +[W ~ RN +W￿
~ RN]
@ ~ RN
@￿￿ +[W ~ P￿N +W￿
~ P￿N]
@ ~ P￿N
@￿￿ +[W ~ R￿N +W￿
~ R￿N]
@ ~ R￿N
@￿￿ = 0: (22)
For the case of linear demands, it can be shown that e¢ ciency requires t￿
h +t￿
f = 0 and th +tf = 0,
despite the Cournot environment (see Bagwell and Staiger, 2009a). With general demands, e¢ cient
trade policy intervention may entail either net trade restrictions or net trade promotion.
We now formally establish that the Nash policy choices are ine¢ cient. Adding the Nash con-
ditions (17) and (20) together, using (15) and (16) to con￿rm that W ~ P￿wN = E = ￿W￿
~ P￿wN and
W￿
~ PwN = M = ￿W ~ PwN, and noting that d ~ PwN
dth = @ ~ PwN
@￿ ￿ 1 yields


















where we use MN to denote the Nash home-country import volume. Similarly, adding the Nash
conditions (18) and (19) together, and noting that d ~ P￿wN
dt￿
f
= @ ~ P￿wN
@￿￿ ￿ 1 yields
[W ~ PN +W￿
~ PN]
@ ~ PN
@￿￿ +[W ~ RN +W￿
~ RN]
@ ~ RN
@￿￿ +[W ~ P￿N +W￿
~ P￿N]
@ ~ P￿N





where we use EN to denote the Nash home-country export volume. Comparing (23) with the
e¢ ciency condition (21), and under the assumption that the second-order conditions for joint-
welfare maximization hold, it is apparent that for any ￿￿ the level of ￿ implied by the Nash tari⁄
condition (23) is ine¢ ciently high. Similarly, comparing (24) with the e¢ ciency condition (22), it
is apparent that for any ￿ the level of ￿￿ implied by the Nash tari⁄ condition (24) is ine¢ ciently
high. Thus, in this environment the Nash policy choices result in trade barriers that are too high.17
2.5 Politically Optimal Policies and E¢ ciency
To determine the reason for the ine¢ ciency of the Nash tari⁄ choices, we now follow Bagwell and
Staiger (1999, 2001) and de￿ne politically optimal tari⁄s as those tari⁄s that would hypothetically
be chosen by governments unilaterally if they did not value the pure international rent-shifting
associated with the terms-of-trade movements induced by their unilateral tari⁄choices. Speci￿cally,
we suppose that the home government acts as if W ~ PwN ￿ 0 and W ~ P￿wN ￿ 0 when choosing its
17In particular, beginning from the Nash equilibrium tari⁄ levels, a reduction in ￿ will increase joint welfare and
thereby move countries toward the international e¢ ciency frontier. A similar interpretation applies for (24) and (22)
and the Nash level of ￿
￿.
15politically optimal tari⁄, while the foreign government acts as if W￿
~ P￿wN ￿ 0 and W￿
~ PwN ￿ 0 when
choosing its politically optimal tari⁄. We therefore de￿ne politically optimal tari⁄s as those tari⁄s
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With politically optimal tari⁄s de￿ned in this way, we may ask whether politically optimal tari⁄s
are e¢ cient, and thereby explore whether the Nash ine¢ ciencies identi￿ed above can be given a
terms-of-trade interpretation, according to which the fundamental problem faced by governments
in designing their trade agreement is to ￿nd a way to eliminate terms-of-trade manipulation.
With regard to the nature of the thought experiment envisioned in the politically optimal
tari⁄s, there is an important distinction between the perfectly competitive environment considered
in Bagwell and Staiger (1999, 2001) and the imperfectly competitive setting that we analyze here.18
In the perfectly competitive setting, domestic welfare can be written as W(P;Pw) as we have
observed, and the politically optimal tari⁄ for the domestic government then satis￿es WP
dP
dt = 0.
Thus, in the case of perfect competition, it is immaterial whether the thought experiment associated
with politically optimal tari⁄s is interpreted to mean that the government acts ￿as if￿WPw ￿ 0 or
rather that the government acts ￿as if￿dPw
dt ￿ 0, because either way we have WPw dPw
dt ￿ 0.19 Notice
that, under the second interpretation, politically optimal tari⁄s are the tari⁄s that governments
would choose unilaterally if they were ￿small￿in world markets.
In the presence of imperfectly competitive ￿rms, however, this second interpretation is not valid.
To see why, consider the home country, and recall that the home welfare function now includes
~ P￿N and ~ R￿N. And observe as well that the relationship ~ P￿wN(t￿
f;￿￿;￿) = ~ P￿N(￿￿;￿)￿t￿
f implies
d ~ P￿N
dth = d ~ P￿wN
dth , while the relationship ~ R￿N(￿￿;￿) = ~ PwN(th;￿￿;￿) ￿ ’ ￿ tf implies d ~ R￿N
dth = d ~ PwN
dth .
Consequently, if the home government were to act ￿as if￿ d ~ P￿wN
dth ￿ 0 and d ~ PwN
dth ￿ 0, it would
then by necessity also act ￿as if￿ d ~ P￿N
dth ￿ 0 and d ~ R￿N
dth ￿ 0, and so its unilaterally chosen import
tari⁄ would satisfy W ~ PN
@ ~ PN
@￿ + W ~ RN
@ ~ RN
@￿ = 0, which di⁄ers from the expression for the politically
optimal home import tari⁄ in the ￿rst condition of (25). An analogous statement applies for the
other home policy instrument and for each policy instrument of the foreign government. In e⁄ect, in
the presence of imperfect competition, it no longer makes sense to think of a hypothetical situation
in which governments act as if they were small in world markets, because their ￿rms are not small.
18This distinction is shared as well with the ￿xed-number-of-￿rms imperfectly competitive environment considered
in Bagwell and Staiger (2009).
19Bagwell and Staiger (1999, footnote 11) stress the ￿rst of these interpretations in their formal analysis, but both
interpretations are valid in the competitive markets setting.
16We now proceed to o⁄er a formal evaluation of the e¢ ciency properties of politically optimal
tari⁄s as de￿ned by (25). This is easily done: the ￿rst and fourth conditions in (25), when summed
together, imply the e¢ ciency condition (21); and the second and third conditions in (25), when
summed together, imply the e¢ ciency condition (22). Politically optimal tari⁄s are thus e¢ cient.
Put di⁄erently, if governments could be induced not to value the pure international rent-shifting
associated with the terms-of-trade movements caused by their unilateral tari⁄ choices, then they
would set e¢ cient tari⁄s. Evidently, the ￿rm-delocation motive for trade-policy intervention pro-
vides no independent source of international ine¢ ciency in the Cournot delocation model.
It is interesting to compare the Nash and politically optimal trade policies, so that we may
understand the nature of the import and export policy commitments that government must make
if they are to move from the Nash to the political optimum in the Cournot delocation model.
A complete comparison is di¢ cult to undertake without further structure, however. With the
restriction of linear demand, we show in Bagwell and Staiger (2009a) that a political optimum
exists and that the politically optimal policy is free trade with respect to both import and export
tari⁄s.20 As we note above, for the linear-demand case, we also show in Bagwell and Staiger (2009a)
that the Nash import policy is an import tari⁄ and the Nash export policy is an export tax. As
we observe above, it is also true that, beginning from free trade, each government has a unilateral
incentive to subsidize its exports. For the linear-demand case, we thus argue in Bagwell and Staiger
(2009a) that the e¢ cient political optimum (free trade) requires that governments be restrained
from imposing import tari⁄s and export subsidies, despite the fact that the unilateral incentive to
subsidize exports does not arise in the model until import tari⁄s are restrained to su¢ ciently low
levels.
A ￿nal point worth emphasizing is the important role played by both import and export policies
in establishing the e¢ ciency of the political optimum. If, for example, governments were assumed
only to have import tari⁄s (th for the home country and t￿
f for the foreign country) at their disposal,
then it is still the case that e¢ ciency would be de￿ned as in (21) and (22) above, owing to the
redundancy of the export instruments t￿
h and tf in terms of their impacts on the total trade taxes ￿
and ￿￿, and hence on ~ PN, ~ RN, ~ P￿N and ~ R￿N. The e¢ cient total trade taxes would then be achieved
entirely through th and t￿
f. But as can be seen from the conditions for the political optimum in
(25), the politically optimal setting of th and t￿
f alone could not in general achieve e¢ ciency.
Therefore, the e¢ ciency of the political optimum ￿and hence the ability to interpret the prob-
lem that a trade agreement can solve as a terms-of-trade problem ￿hinges importantly on the
assumption that governments have su¢ cient trade-tax instruments at their disposal. If they did
not, then other non-terms-of-trade problems might also be addressed by a trade agreement (in
this setting, just as more generally). But viewed in this way, it is also clear what the associated
non-terms-of-trade problem would be: a trade agreement could help substitute for missing trade
policy instruments (e.g., export policies) which, if available, would then convert the role of a trade
20In fact, under the requirement that trade policies are symmetric across countries, we show in Bagwell and Staiger
(2009a) that the political optimum is unique.
17agreement back to the standard terms-of-trade driven Prisoners￿Dilemma.21
We summarize the results of this section with:22
Proposition 1 In the Cournot delocation model, the Nash trade policies are ine¢ cient, and the
ine¢ ciency arises only because governments value the pure international rent-shifting associated
with the terms-of-trade movements induced by their unilateral tari⁄ choices.
2.6 Reciprocity
An important implication of Proposition 1 is that, for the Cournot delocation model, just as in the
competitive benchmark model, a trade agreement that is founded on the principle of reciprocity can
guide governments from their ine¢ cient unilateral policies to the e¢ ciency frontier. To establish
this implication, we follow Bagwell and Staiger (1999, 2001) and de￿ne tari⁄ changes that conform
to reciprocity as those that bring about equal changes in the volume of each country￿ s imports and
exports when valued at existing world prices.
Working within the general equilibrium interpretation of the model described at the beginning
of section 2.1, taking account of trade in the numeraire good, and letting a superscript ￿0￿denote
original trade tax levels and a superscript ￿1￿denote new trade tax levels, it is direct to establish
that tari⁄ changes conforming to reciprocity must satisfy23
[ ~ PwN(t0
h;￿￿0;￿0) ￿ ~ PwN(t1
h;￿￿1;￿1)]M(￿￿1;￿1) (26)
= [ ~ P￿wN(t￿0
f ;￿￿0;￿0) ￿ ~ P￿wN(t￿1
f ;￿￿1;￿1)]E(￿￿1;￿1):
According to (26), tari⁄ changes that conform to reciprocity imply either that (i) world prices are
left unchanged as a result of the tari⁄ changes, so that ~ PwN(t0
h;￿￿0;￿0) = ~ PwN(t1
h;￿￿1;￿1) and
~ P￿wN(t￿0
f ;￿￿0;￿0) = ~ P￿wN(t￿1
f ;￿￿1;￿1), or (ii) world prices are altered in a net-trade-tax-revenue
neutral fashion. Either way, it is clear that there can be no pure international rent shifting across
countries as a result of tari⁄ changes that conform to reciprocity. Moreover, notice that under
(ii) there exists an alternative set of tari⁄ changes which would preserve ￿￿1 and ￿1 and hence
M(￿￿1;￿1) and E(￿￿1;￿1) but satisfy ~ PwN(t0
h;￿￿0;￿0) = ~ PwN(t1
h;￿￿1;￿1) and ~ P￿wN(t￿0
f ;￿￿0;￿0) =
~ P￿wN(t￿1
f ;￿￿1;￿1), and which would therefore continue to satisfy reciprocity and leave each country
21We emphasize that what is required for the e¢ ciency of the political optimum in this setting is that each country
has a complete set of trade tax instruments, in the sense that each government has available the use of an import
tari⁄ and an export tax/subsidy, not that each country has a complete set of (trade and domestic) tax instruments
with which to achieve the ￿rst best.
22In reality, political economy concerns are an important reason for trade policy intervention. According to the
terms-of-trade theory, adding these concerns does not alter the basic reason for a trade agreement (see Bagwell and
Staiger, 1999, for a statement of this result in the competitive benchmark setting, and Bagwell and Staiger, 2009, for
an extension of this result to a setting of imperfect competition with ￿xed numbers of ￿rms). In the free-entry setting
that we consider in this paper, however, it is not immediately clear how to introduce political economy considerations,
because those considerations typically lead governments to place extra weight on producer surplus as they make their
trade policy choices, and in our free-entry setting equilibrium producer surplus is always driven to zero. For this
reason, we leave the introduction of political economy concerns in this kind of setting to future work.
23The steps to derive (26) employ the balanced trade condition that must hold at the original and the new world
prices, and are identical to those described in note 19 of Bagwell and Staiger (2001).
18indi⁄erent between the original tari⁄ changes and this alternative.24 As a consequence, we can
henceforth and without loss of generality equate tari⁄ changes that conform to reciprocity in this
setting with tari⁄ changes that leave each world price unaltered.
We are now prepared to interpret and evaluate the principle of reciprocity within the Cournot
delocation model. We do so in two steps.25
First, beginning from the Nash equilibrium, we wish to evaluate the impacts on home and
foreign welfare of small changes in trade policies that reduce the total trade impediments ￿ and ￿￿
while satisfying reciprocity. Notice that with the four trade taxes th, t￿
h, tf and t￿
f, the magnitude
of the changes in ￿ and ￿￿ can be chosen independently while adjusting th and t￿
f to maintain
d ~ PwN = 0 = d ~ P￿wN and thereby satisfy reciprocity (the changes in ￿ and ￿￿ imply changes in
M and E while the changes in th and t￿
f imply changes in the volume of numeraire trade which
assures reciprocity). Therefore, the reciprocal trade liberalization we consider amounts to a small
reduction in ￿ (d￿ < 0), and a small reduction in ￿￿ (d￿￿ < 0) whose relative magnitude is given
by d￿￿
d￿ > 0, all induced by changes in the four underlying trade taxes which conform to reciprocity
and hence satisfy d ~ PwN = 0 = d ~ P￿wN.
As there is no implied change in either world price, the impact of a small amount of trade
liberalization that conforms to reciprocity on home-country welfare is given by
￿ f[W ~ PN
@ ~ PN
@￿
+ W ~ RN
@ ~ RN
@￿
+ W ~ P￿N
@ ~ P￿N
@￿




+ [W ~ PN
@ ~ PN
@￿￿ + W ~ RN
@ ~ RN
@￿￿ + W ~ P￿N
@ ~ P￿N







































24This can be con￿rmed as follows. Consider the home country. Beginning from a set of trade tax changes that













































0), and that under these
alternative new trade taxes the reciprocity condition (26) is still met. It remains to con￿rm that the net trade tax
revenue collected by the home country is the same under either set of new trade taxes. To conserve notation, we now
suppress tari⁄arguments and let a superscript ￿0￿on a price denote that price as a function of original trade tax levels,
and let a superscript ￿1￿on a price denote that price as a function of new trade tax levels, and let a superscript ￿1
0￿on
a price denote that price as a function of alternative new trade tax levels. Now observe that home net revenue under the








1), while under the alternative set of new








1), and hence home-country net revenue under









But this condition is guaranteed by the reciprocity condition (26). An analogous argument holds for the foreign
country.
25These two steps consider in sequence the two ways in which the principle of reciprocity ￿nds representation in
the GATT/WTO. See Bagwell and Staiger (1999, 2001, 2002) for more on the role of reciprocity in the GATT/WTO.
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]g:
We wish to explore whether each country gains from at least a small amount of trade liberal-
ization that conforms to reciprocity. This amounts to asking whether each expression in (27) is
positive. The ￿rst term in each expression records how each country feels about the small reduction
in the total impediment to its import trade. This term is positive because of the ￿rm-delocation
e⁄ect: an increase in the total impediment to import trade in one country leads to a lower price
in that country￿ s market and a higher price in the market of the other country (e.g., for the home
country￿ s import trade, we have @ ~ PN
@￿ < 0 < @ ~ P￿N
@￿ ). Correspondingly, since reciprocity neutralizes
any world-price movements, (17) and (19) imply that each country would desire a reduced total
impediment to its import trade at the Nash equilibrium if this could be achieved without world-
price movements. This desire in turn re￿ ects the standard terms-of-trade impacts of import tari⁄s
in the model. The second term in each expression records how each country feels about the small
reduction in the total impediment to its export trade. Due again to the ￿rm-delocation e⁄ect, this
term is negative. Accordingly, since reciprocity neutralizes any world-price movements, (18) and
(20) imply that each country would desire an increase in the total impediment to its export trade at
the Nash equilibrium if this could be achieved without world-price movements. This desire re￿ ects
the non-standard terms-of-trade impacts of export subsidies in the model.
Hence, if trade liberalization conforming to reciprocity is to bene￿t both countries in the Cournot
delocation model, the bene￿t each country enjoys from the reduction in the total trade impedi-
ment in its import sector must outweigh the cost that each su⁄ers from the reduced total trade
impediment in its export sector. This suggests that the magnitudes of d￿ and d￿￿ must be carefully
balanced. For example, it is easy to see that trade liberalization that conforms to reciprocity but
that is too heavily weighted toward either d￿ or d￿￿ cannot bene￿t both countries.26 This is a novel
consideration, and it can be traced to the non-standard terms-of-trade e⁄ect of export subsidies in
the Cournot delocation model: as we have emphasized above, the standard terms-of-trade e⁄ects
of export taxes are symmetric with import tari⁄s, and when those e⁄ects are present each country
bene￿ts from reductions in trade barriers conforming to reciprocity in both its import and export
sectors (see Bagwell and Staiger, 2001). In the Cournot delocation model, though, governments
26Consider trade liberalization that conforms to reciprocity and that satis￿es d￿ < 0 = d￿
￿. With each world
price ￿xed under reciprocity, it is direct to see from (19) and (20) that, beginning from the Nash equilibrium, the
foreign country must lose from trade liberalization that takes this form, as (27) indicates. It is also illuminating to
see why this must be so. To satisfy the ￿xed-world-price conditions implied by reciprocity in this case, we must have
d ~ P
wN = 0 =
@ ~ PN
@￿ d￿ ￿ dth and d ~ P
￿wN = 0 =
@ ~ P￿N
@￿ d￿ ￿ dt
￿
f, which with d￿ < 0 = d￿
￿ implies dth > 0 and dt
￿
f < 0
and also dtf < 0 and dt
￿
h > 0. This means that the foreign country faces more restrictive import and export policies
from its trading partner as a result of these changes, and it is for this reason that it is hurt by trade liberalization in
this case.
20must be careful to choose the magnitude of d￿￿
d￿ so that the bene￿ts of reduced trade impediments
in the import sector outweigh the costs of reduced trade impediments in the export sector for each
country.
Nevertheless, it is direct to show using (27) that there is a non-empty range for d￿￿
d￿ ￿and
hence for the relative magnitudes of the reductions in ￿ and ￿￿ ￿within which, beginning from the
Nash equilibrium, trade liberalization conforming to reciprocity must o⁄er strict bene￿ts to each
country. We may therefore conclude that, beginning from the Nash equilibrium, both countries
can gain from at least a small amount of trade liberalization that conforms to reciprocity in the
Cournot delocation model.
Our second step is to consider the impact of reciprocity when it is applied in response to the
reintroduction of trade barriers. In particular, we now establish that, if countries negotiate to the
political optimum, then neither country has an interest in unilaterally raising its import tari⁄ or
export subsidy if it is understood that such an act would be met with a reciprocal action from its
trading partner.
To con￿rm this observation, consider the impact on home-country welfare if, beginning from
the political optimum de￿ned by (25), the home country were to raise slightly its import tari⁄
(increase th), and in response to this the foreign country were to respond in a reciprocal fashion
with its import and export taxes so as to prevent the world prices from changing. Denoting these
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which evaluated at the political optimum is zero by (25). Similarly, if the home country were to
raise slightly its export subsidy (reduce t￿N
h ), and in response to this the foreign country were to
respond in a reciprocal fashion with its import and export taxes so as to prevent the world prices









jrec), the impact on home-country
welfare is given by
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which again evaluated at the political optimum is zero by (25). Exactly the same arguments apply
to each of the policies of the foreign country.
Hence, the terms-of-trade Prisoners￿Dilemma problem that characterizes the Nash ine¢ ciency
in the Cournot delocation model ￿like the competitive benchmark model ￿provides a foundation
for understanding why a trade agreement that is founded on the principle of reciprocity can guide
21governments from their ine¢ cient unilateral policies to the e¢ ciency frontier. We summarize with:
Corollary 1 In the Cournot delocation model, the principle of reciprocity serves to ￿undo￿ the
terms-of-trade driven ine¢ ciency that occurs when governments pursue unilateral trade policies.
3 Delocation with Monopolistic Competition
In this section we consider a variant of the model in Venables (1987), where the variant that we
analyze is similar to that developed in Helpman and Krugman (1989). Here, markets are integrated,
monopolistically competitive ￿rms use a single factor of production to produce di⁄erentiated vari-
eties according to an increasing-returns technology, consumer demand for di⁄erentiated products
takes a CES form, and there is free entry of ￿rms in both home and foreign countries. As before, a
freely-traded homogeneous ￿outside￿good is produced with the same factor of production accord-
ing to a constant-returns technology. The outside good enters linearly into utility and is always
produced and consumed in each country in positive amounts. These assumptions have the e⁄ect
of tying down marginal costs of di⁄erentiated-goods production in both countries and eliminating
income e⁄ects on the demand for di⁄erentiated products as well. We allow for the presence of
￿iceberg￿transport costs on the trade in di⁄erentiated products between countries, and indeed it is
now the savings on transport costs implied by the ￿rm-delocation e⁄ects of trade policy intervention
￿rather than the impacts on competition as in the Cournot model of the previous section ￿that
can enhance the welfare of the intervening country in this setting. Finally, and importantly, in ad-
dition to the import policies considered in Helpman and Krugman (1989), we permit governments
to pursue export policies as well.
By construction, this model has some very special features As emphasized by Helpman and
Krugman (1989), the model displays no terms-of-trade impacts of import tari⁄s. On the other
hand, as we will show, terms-of-trade impacts of export policies are present in the model, and in
contrast to the Cournot delocation model they are of the conventional kind although somewhat
extreme. Be that as it may, our main purpose is again to identify and interpret the sources of
ine¢ ciency that arise when governments set their trade policies unilaterally, and to thereby explore
the potential role and design of a trade agreement in this environment.
3.1 Model Setup
There are two countries (home and foreign), each endowed with a large amount of labor (L and
L￿, respectively), which is the only factor of production. Consumer utility in the home and foreign
country is given, respectively, by




22where CD is an index of consumption of a basket of di⁄erentiated goods, which for the moment
we treat as a single (composite) good referred to as good D, CY is consumption of a homogenous
good Y , ￿ ￿￿denotes a foreign-country variable, and ￿ 2 (0;1) is a parameter of the utility function.
Good Y is produced with labor alone according to a constant-returns-to-scale production function
common across countries (1 unit of labor produces 1 unit of good Y ). Good Y is always produced
in each country (due to the large supply of labor in each country) and freely traded across countries,
so that its price (and hence the wage of labor) is ￿xed and equalized everywhere in the world. We
treat good Y as the numeraire and thus normalize its price to 1.
Notice from the utility function U that the marginal utility of consuming another unit of good
Y is 1, while the marginal utility of consuming another unit of good D is (CD)￿￿1, and analogously
for the utility function U￿. Utility maximization in each country requires that quantities demanded
are chosen so that the ratio of marginal utilities for goods D and Y is set equal to the ratio of
prices for goods D and Y . Recalling that the price of good Y is normalized to 1, and letting P
denote the price of good D faced by consumers in the home country and P￿ the price of good D
faced by consumers in the foreign country, utility maximization then implies
CD = P￿￿; and (29)
C￿
D = (P￿)￿￿;
where ￿ = 1
1￿￿ > 1 is the elasticity of (home or foreign country) demand for good D. The indirect
utility functions of the two countries may then be written as
V (P;I) = (￿￿)￿1P￿￿￿ + I; and (30)
V ￿(P￿;I￿) = (￿￿)￿1(P￿)￿￿￿ + I￿;
where I (I￿) denotes home-country (foreign) income measured in units of the numeraire good Y .
As mentioned above, the quantity CD is an index of home-country consumption of di⁄erentiated





￿, where ci is home-country consumption of variety i of the di⁄erentiated good and ￿ is a
preference parameter with ￿ 2 (0;1). Note that all varieties i enter symmetrically into this index.









where pi is the price for variety i paid by home-country consumers. Analogously, for the foreign














23where p￿i is the price for variety i paid by foreign-country consumers.
The home-country demand for a variety i of the di⁄erentiated good then takes the form






where ￿ = 1
1￿￿ > 1. Plugging into (33) the expression for CD in (29) and simplifying yields
ci = (pi)￿￿P￿￿￿ ￿ ci(pi;P): (34)
We assume that the elasticity of substitution between varieties within the di⁄erentiated product
sector (￿) is greater than the overall price elasticity (￿). An analogous expression may be derived
for the foreign-country demand for an individual variety i of the di⁄erentiated good:
c￿i = (p￿i)￿￿(P￿)￿￿￿ ￿ c￿i(p￿i;P￿): (35)
Notice that, due to the existence of the outside good Y and the way that it enters into the utility
functions in (28), there are no income e⁄ects on the demand for di⁄erentiated products, as (34) and
(35) con￿rm. This property provides a key simpli￿cation that will become very useful once trade
policies are introduced below, because with this property the revenue consequences of trade policy
intervention have no bearing on the equilibrium conditions in the di⁄erentiated products industry
(a feature also shared by the Cournot delocation model of the previous section).
Technology for producing individual varieties is the same across varieties and available every-
where in the world: any individual variety i can be produced with a ￿xed cost of labor F and a
constant marginal cost in terms of labor ￿ (recall that the wage of labor is ￿xed at 1 everywhere in
the world). In light of the ￿xed cost of production, no variety will be produced by more than one
￿rm or in more than one location, and each ￿rm will be the monopoly supplier of its variety.
If a home-country ￿rm sells to foreign consumers, it confronts the following trade costs: an
￿iceberg￿transport cost ￿ > 0 according to which a fraction ￿ of the good is used up in shipment;
an ad valorem export tax imposed by the home government at rate ￿￿
h (an export subsidy if ￿￿
h < 0);
and an ad valorem import tari⁄ imposed by the foreign government at rate ￿￿
f. We denote (1 plus)
the total ad valorem trade impediment on home exports to the foreign market by ￿￿, where27
￿￿ ￿ 1 + ￿ + ￿￿
h + ￿￿
f: (36)
We assume that markets are integrated and focus throughout on non-prohibitive trade costs, so
that the wedge between the home market price for a home produced variety i and the price at which
that variety sells in the foreign market is given by p￿i
h = ￿￿pi
h, where pi
h denotes the home-market
27As re￿ ected in (36), all trade impediments are expressed in ad valorem terms relative to the factory-gate price
^ p (as characterized below). Hence, we assume that the foreign importer buys from the factory at price ^ p, then pays
the export tax ￿
￿
h^ p and the import tax ￿
￿
f ^ p and transport costs ￿^ p.
24price of a home-produced good and p￿i
h denotes the foreign-market price of a home-produced good.28
Similarly, if a foreign ￿rm wishes to sell to home-country consumers, we assume that it must
confront the following trade costs: the iceberg transport cost ￿ according to which a fraction ￿
of the good is used up in shipment; an ad valorem export tax imposed by the foreign government
at rate ￿f (an export subsidy if ￿f < 0); and an ad valorem import tari⁄ imposed by the home
government at rate ￿h. We denote (1 plus) the total ad valorem trade impediment on foreign
exports to the home-country market by ￿, where29
￿ ￿ 1 + ￿ + ￿h + ￿f: (37)
Again, because we assume that markets are integrated and trade costs are non-prohibitive, the
wedge between the foreign market price for a foreign produced variety i and the price at which that
variety sells in the home market is given by pi
f = ￿p￿i
f , where p￿i
f denotes the foreign-market price
of a foreign-produced good and pi
f denotes the home-market price of a foreign-produced good.
We may now write down the pro￿ts for a home ￿rm producing variety i who sets a price pi
h:
￿i = (pi
h ￿ ￿) ￿ [ci(pi
h;P) + (1 + ￿)c￿i(p￿i
h ;P￿)] ￿ F:
When choosing a price for its variety i, the ￿rm is assumed to take the price indexes P and P￿ as
￿xed. Using p￿i
h = ￿￿pi
h and the particular functional forms of ci(pi
h;P) and c￿i(p￿i
h ;P￿) given in
(34) and (35) respectively, it may then be shown that equating marginal revenue to marginal cost





￿ ￿ ^ p (38)
We now record the foreign-market price of a (representative) home-produced variety:
p￿i
h = ￿￿^ p ￿ p￿
h(￿￿): (39)
Similarly, the pro￿ts for a foreign ￿rm producing variety i who sets a price p￿i
f are given by
￿￿i = (p￿i
f ￿ ￿) ￿ [c￿i(p￿i
f ;P￿) + (1 + ￿)ci(pi
f;P)] ￿ F:
Again when choosing a price for its single variety i, the ￿rm is assumed to take the price indexes
28It is convenient to follow Helpman and Krugman (1989, Ch. 7) in the modeling of iceberg transport costs,
although their approach di⁄ers slightly from the conventional modeling of iceberg transport costs introduced by
Samuelson (1954). According to the formulation used by Helpman and Krugman, a fraction ￿ of the amount of an
export good that is delivered to the foreign port is used up in transit, while the conventional assumption following
Samuelson is that a fraction ￿ of the amount of an export good that leaves the factory gate actually arrives at the
foreign port. Implicit in our modeling of iceberg transport costs and tari⁄s is that international shipping services are
freely traded.
29As re￿ ected in (37), we again express all trade impediments in ad valorem terms relative to the factory-gate price
^ p. Hence, we assume that the home importer buys from the factory at price ^ p (as characterized below), then pays
the export tax ￿f ^ p and the import tax ￿h^ p and transport costs ￿^ p.
25P and P￿ as ￿xed. Using pi
f = ￿p￿i
f and the particular functional forms of ci(pi
f;P) and c￿i(p￿i
f ;P￿)
given in (34) and (35) respectively, it may then be shown that equating marginal revenue to marginal





￿ ￿ ^ p (40)
for a foreign ￿rm producing any variety i. We may now also record the domestic-market price of a
(representative) foreign-produced variety:
pi
f = ￿^ p ￿ pf(￿): (41)
Hence, using (31) and (32) in combination with (38)-(41), if there are nh home ￿rms producing
di⁄erentiated varieties and nf foreign ￿rms, then the home and foreign price indexes are
P = [nh ￿ ^ p
￿




￿ ￿ P(nh;nf;pf); and (42)
P￿ = [nf ￿ ^ p
￿







where for notational simplicity we suppress the dependence of pf on ￿ and p￿
h on ￿￿ in what follows.
Finally, free entry implies that nh and nf adjust to ensure




(^ p ￿ ￿)
(43)
c￿(^ p;P￿(nh;nf;p￿
h)) + (1 + ￿)c(pf;P(nh;nf;pf)) =
F
(^ p ￿ ￿)
;
where we now utilize the symmetric structure of the model and remove the superscript i￿ s from
the home- and foreign-country demands for an individual variety. These two zero-maximized-pro￿t
conditions determine nh(pf;p￿
h) and nf(pf;p￿
h).30 Plugging these expressions into the expressions
for P and P￿ in (42) then yields P(pf;p￿
h) and P￿(pf;p￿
h). As in the previous section, our focus on
non-prohibitive trade taxes ensures that both nh(pf;p￿
h) and nf(pf;p￿
h) are positive, but condition
(43) ignores the fact that nh and nf can only take on integer values. We treat nh(pf;p￿
h) and
nf(pf;p￿
h) as continuous and di⁄erentiable functions in what follows (as is standard), which is a
good approximation if the number of ￿rms is large.
Notice from (42) that, for ￿xed nh and nf, each country￿ s price index rises with the level of
trade impediments faced by its importers and is independent of the level of trade impediments that
its exporters face. On the other hand, beginning from a level of trade impediments that is positive,
it is also clear from (42) that a reduction in nf matched by an equal increase in nh would reduce
the domestic price index P and raise the foreign price index P￿.
From these initial observations, and with positive transport costs (￿ > 0) but all trade taxes
set initially to zero, consider then the impact on home and foreign price indexes of introducing a
30We are not concerned with changes in transport costs, and so we suppress dependence on ￿ here and throughout.
26positive home import tari⁄￿h. With nh and nf initially held ￿xed, (42) implies that p￿
h and P￿ are
unchanged while P and thus c(^ p;P(nh;nf;pf)) rise; furthermore, calculations con￿rm that the rise
in P is less than the rise in pf and that c(pf;P(nh;nf;pf)) falls. It then follows that, holding ￿xed
nh and nf, a positive home import tari⁄ ￿h increases the left-hand-side of the top condition in (43)
while decreasing the left-hand-side of the bottom condition in (43), implying positive pro￿ts for
home ￿rms and negative pro￿ts for foreign ￿rms. As a result, there must be entry of home ￿rms (a
rise in nh) and exit of foreign ￿rms (a drop in nf), and to restore zero pro￿ts for home and foreign
￿rms the rise in nh and drop in nf must lead ultimately to a rise in P￿ and a drop in P.31
We may therefore conclude that with positive transport costs, the imposition of a small domestic









the essence of the ￿rm-delocation e⁄ect associated with import protection in the monopolistic
competition model: by raising barriers to imports, foreign ￿rms can be ￿delocated￿to the home
market, where home consumers then save on trade costs in the form of a lower overall price index,
at the expense of foreign consumers whose price index rises.32 Moreover, it is immediate from (42)
and (43) that the introduction of a small foreign export subsidy (a fall in ￿f beginning from free
trade) has an impact on P and P￿ which is exactly the opposite from the impact of a rise in ￿h








d￿f . Hence, by employing an export subsidy
￿f < 0, the foreign government can reduce P￿ and raise P and thereby engineer a savings in trade
costs for its consumers. Finally, the same statements apply to the foreign import tari⁄ (￿￿
f > 0)
and the home export subsidy (￿￿










































31More formally, we may start with any initial set of policies, such as the free-trade policies, at which trade taxes




f are nonnegative, and then consider a slight increase in ￿ triggered, for example, by a slight
increase in ￿h. Following Helpman and Krugman (1989, Chapter 7), we consider a graph with P
￿￿￿￿ on the y axis
and P
￿￿" on the x axis. At the initial policies, calculations con￿rm that the home-￿rm and foreign-￿rm zero pro￿t
loci are downward sloping and that the zero pro￿t locus for a home ￿rm is steeper than that for a foreign ￿rm. A
slight increase in ￿ shifts the foreign iso-pro￿t locus upward, requiring a higher value for P
￿￿￿￿ and thus P
￿ and a
lower value for P
￿￿￿ and thus P. From here, we may use (42) to con￿rm that the increase in ￿ induces a higher
value for nh and a lower value for nf. If the initial policies are at or near free trade, calculations also con￿rm that
a lower value for nh + nf is induced. Intuitively, following an increase in ￿, the restoration of the home and foreign
zero-pro￿t conditions in (43) requires that P and P
￿ move in opposite direction, because if both increase then the
pro￿ts of home ￿rms will continue to be positive, while if both decrease then the pro￿ts of foreign ￿rms will continue
to be negative. But with preferences identical across countries and ￿ > 0, local sales contribute relatively more to
the pro￿ts of each country￿ s ￿rms than do export sales, ruling out the possibility that zero pro￿ts could be restored
for both home and foreign ￿rms with a rise in P and a fall in P
￿. The only remaining possibility is then that P
￿
must rise and P must fall.
32The delocation e⁄ect of trade protection in a monopolistically competitive environment was ￿rst identi￿ed in
Venables (1987), but it is closely related to the home-market e⁄ect identi￿ed in Krugman (1980). The delocation e⁄ect
for Cournot ￿rms in Venables (1985) is analogous but, as we have described in the previous section, in the Cournot
case the entry/exit of ￿rms alters ￿rm-level prices through competitive e⁄ects, whereas in the current monopolistically
competitive setting ￿rm-level prices are unchanged by entry/exit but the price index is nonetheless altered through
changes in the numbers of home- and foreign- produced varieties.
273.2 Representation of Welfare
The impacts of trade taxes on the price indexes P and P￿ that we have just described capture
the ￿rm-delocation e⁄ects associated with trade policy in this setting, but these e⁄ects are not by
themselves enough to determine the welfare impacts of trade policy, as (30) indicates. We must
also determine how trade taxes e⁄ect income in each country (I and I￿).
To this end, note that our assumption that labor is the only factor of production and that the
wage is ￿xed at 1, in combination with free entry ensuring that pro￿ts are zero, implies that income
in each country is given by the labor force in the country plus the country￿ s net trade tax revenue.
Therefore, denoting home imports (foreign exports) by M and home exports (foreign imports) by










we may then express home and foreign income as33
I = L + ￿￿
h^ pE(pf;p￿
h) + ￿h^ pM(pf;p￿
h); and




We next de￿ne the world price for exports to the foreign market by p￿w = (1+￿￿
h)^ p ￿ p￿w(￿￿
h),
implying that ￿￿
h^ p = p￿w￿ ^ p. Using p￿
h = (1 + ￿ + ￿￿
h + ￿￿
f)^ p, it then follows also that ￿￿
f ^ p = p￿
h￿
￿^ p ￿ p￿w. And similarly, we de￿ne the world price for exports to the domestic market by pw =
(1 + ￿f)^ p ￿ pw(￿f), implying that ￿f ^ p = pw￿ ^ p. Using pf = (1 + ￿ + ￿f + ￿h)^ p, it then follows
also that ￿h^ p = pf ￿ ￿^ p ￿ pw.
With these pricing relationships, and recalling from (38) that ^ p is simply a function of parameters
of the model, we may rewrite the expressions for income as
I = L + [p￿w ￿ ^ p]E(pf;p￿
h) + [pf ￿ ￿^ p ￿ pw]M(pf;p￿
h) ￿ I(p￿
h;pf;pw;p￿w); and
I￿ = L￿ + [pw ￿ ^ p]M(pf;p￿
h) + [p￿
h ￿ ￿^ p ￿ p￿w]E(pf;p￿
h) ￿ I￿(p￿
h;pf;pw;p￿w):
Finally, using these expressions for I and I￿, we may write the indirect utility functions of the two









Compared to the welfare expressions in (30), the expressions in (44) are particularly informative
33Recall that our modeling of iceberg transport costs assumes that international shipping services are freely traded,
which is why trade taxes are applied only to the delivered quantities of traded di⁄erentiated goods, and not also to
the fraction of the good used up in transport (the ￿shipping services￿ ). See also note 28.
28for helping to identify the channels through which international externalities associated with trade
policy choices are transmitted in this environment.
Consider ￿rst the world prices p￿w and pw. When the domestic country raises its tax on exports
￿￿
h, the world price of its exports p￿w(￿￿
h) is increased, and as (44) indicates this impacts (negatively)
the welfare of the foreign country. Similarly, when the foreign country raises its tax on exports ￿f,
the world price of its exports pw(￿f) is increased, and as (44) indicates this impacts (negatively) the
welfare of the domestic country. These international policy externalities are identical to the terms-
of-trade externalities that arise in a competitive setting (see Bagwell and Staiger, 1999, 2001). On
the other hand, notice that each country￿ s import tari⁄(￿h for the home country, ￿￿
f for the foreign
country) has no impact on either world price, and so the use of import tari⁄s in this environment
does not entail international externalities that travel through world prices. This is a very special
feature of the model under study, and as Helpman and Krugman (1989, Ch. 7) explain, it arises
here because marginal cost (￿) is tied down by free trade in the numeraire good Y and because the
CES demand speci￿cation ensures that ￿rms in the di⁄erentiated product sector do not alter their
price markup over marginal cost in response to ad valorem trade taxes. Of course, this same feature
implies that each country can alter the world price with its export tax (as we have observed), and
can do so in a rather extreme fashion (100% pass-through of export taxes to consumers abroad),
precisely because ￿rms in the di⁄erentiated product sector do not alter their price markup over
marginal cost in response to ad valorem trade taxes.34
In a perfectly competitive setting, these terms-of-trade externalities would constitute the only
channel through which the policy choices of one country could impact the welfare of the other
country (in the sense that, as discussed in the previous section, within a perfectly competitive
environment the welfare of the domestic and foreign governments under general conditions can be
written in the form W(p;pw) and W￿(p￿;pw)). But as the welfare expressions in (44) con￿rm, in
the current setting things are more complicated. In particular, home welfare now depends directly
on the price of home produced varieties in the foreign market, p￿
h(￿￿); and similarly, foreign welfare
now depends directly on the price of foreign produced varieties in the home market, pf(￿).
This indicates a more complex international policy environment than in the case of perfectly
competitive markets, and as with the Cournot delocation model of the previous section it raises
the possibility that the task of a trade agreement may be more complicated in this environment as
a result. To determine whether this is in fact the case, we proceed to examine the non-cooperative
and e¢ cient policy choices in detail and evaluate the reasons for any divergence between them.
This is the task of the next two subsections.
34Notice too that the world-price consequences of export taxes in the current model are opposite to those in
the Cournot delocation model of the previous section. In that setting, entry and exit alters world prices through
competitive e⁄ects in each of the segmented markets, and as we have described in the previous section the entry and
exit implications of a country￿ s export tax cause its terms-of-trade to worsen rather than improve. In the current
setting, by contrast, entry and exit itself has no impact on world prices.
293.3 Nash Policies and Ine¢ ciency
We next characterize the Nash policy choices, which we take to be the optimal policies that the
governments would choose unilaterally in the absence of a trade agreement. We begin by charac-
terizing the domestic government￿ s best-response import and export policies. Recalling that p￿w
depends only on ￿￿
h and that pw is independent of ￿h and ￿￿
h, and noting from (36), (37), (39)
and (41) that p￿
h is independent of ￿h while pf is independent of ￿￿
h, the ￿rst-order conditions that
















Before turning to characterize the foreign government￿ s best-response policies, it is helpful to
delve further into the ￿rst-order conditions that de￿ne the domestic government￿ s best-response
policy choices, in order to better understand the forces at work in this setting. Using the expression









= ^ p =
dpf
d￿h, the ￿rst-order


























As indicated earlier, the ￿rm-delocation e⁄ect arises in the presence of positive transport costs,




















= ^ p =
dpf
d￿h then implies @P
@pf < 0 and @P
@p￿
h
> 0. Given any foreign
trade policies which ￿ together with the level of transport costs ￿ ￿ imply positive total trade
costs, the ￿rm-delocation e⁄ect is thus present, and the left-hand-side of the top condition in (46)
is then positive when evaluated at domestic free trade policies ￿￿
h = 0 = ￿h, indicating that ￿h > 0
would then be required to satisfy this condition. As a consequence of the ￿rm-delocation motive
for import policy, it is thus natural to expect that the best-response import policy is an import
tari⁄.
By contrast, the sign of the left-hand-side of the bottom expression in (46) when evaluated at
￿￿
h = 0 = ￿h is not clear. Intuitively, there are two opposing motives for export policy in the model:
the ￿rst term is negative as a result of the ￿rm-delocation e⁄ect, and this pushes toward an export
subsidy (￿￿
h < 0 ) as the domestic best-response export policy; but added to this is a second term
(E) which is positive and re￿ ects terms-of-trade considerations, and this pushes toward an export
tax (￿￿
h > 0 ) as the domestic best response export policy. Hence, whether the domestic best-
response export policy is an export subsidy or an import tari⁄ depends on the relative strengths of
the ￿rm-delocation and terms-of-trade motives for export policy intervention.
30Returning now to our main task, with analogous steps we can write the ￿rst-order conditions






















f , are given by the joint solutions
to (45) and (47).
To evaluate the e¢ ciency properties of the Nash tari⁄ choices, we ￿rst need to characterize the
trade policy choices that would be internationally e¢ cient in this environment. Consider, then, the
e¢ cient policies. These are the choices of ￿￿
h, ￿￿
f, ￿f and ￿h that maximize V + V ￿. We note that
I(￿) + I￿(￿) = L + L￿ + [p￿
h ￿ ￿^ p ￿ ^ p]E(pf;p￿
h) + [pf ￿ ￿^ p ￿ ^ p]M(pf;p￿
h) ￿ K(p￿
h;pf);
and so the world prices pw and p￿w drop out of the sum of domestic and foreign incomes, permitting
this sum to be expressed as K(p￿
h;pf). But this in turn implies that joint welfare may be expressed
as






As can be seen, changes in the world prices induced by trade taxes play no role in determining the
e¢ cient setting of trade tax policies, because these changes correspond to pure international rent
shifting.35
Using the expression for joint welfare in (48), recalling that p￿
h depends only on ￿￿ while pf
depends only on ￿, and using (36) and (37) to con￿rm that d￿￿
d￿￿
h




d￿h = 1 = d￿
d￿f ,
it follows that there are only two independent conditions that de￿ne e¢ cient choices of ￿￿
h, ￿￿
f, ￿f
and ￿h, and they may be expressed as:
[Vp￿





d￿￿ = 0; and (49)





35This observation again provides one simple way of understanding why tari⁄ policies that are motivated by
terms-of-trade e⁄ects lead to ine¢ ciencies. To further develop this understanding, we may consider the external
e⁄ect of a change in a country￿ s trade policies on the welfare of its trading partner, when all trade policies are
initially set at their Nash levels. In particular, we may use (36), (37), (39), (41), (44) and (45) to establish that
dV=d￿
￿
f = ￿Vp￿wb p = ￿Eb p < 0 and dV=d￿f = Vpwb p = ￿Mb p < 0, where all expressions are evaluated at Nash
trade policies. Thus, at the Nash equilibrium, an increase in the foreign import or export tari⁄ imposes a negative
externality on domestic country welfare, and it does so only through the induced change in the terms of trade.
Referring also to (47), we may establish an exactly analogous conclusion with regard to the e⁄ect of a change in
domestic trade policies on foreign country welfare.
31To understand the nature of e¢ cient trade policy intervention in this setting, consider e¢ ciency
condition (49). Proceeding along similar lines to those described above, the left-hand-side of this
condition, when evaluated at free trade policies ￿￿
h + ￿￿
f = 0 = ￿f + ￿h and once the symmetry
































2 ￿ nh = nf. The expression in (51) is the product of two bracketed terms. The ￿rst
bracketed term is positive, and the second bracketed term is negative (see footnote 31). Hence,
the left-hand-side of the condition in (49) is negative when evaluated at global free trade policies
￿￿
h+￿￿
f = 0 = ￿f +￿h, indicating that ￿￿
h+￿￿
f < 0 would then be required to satisfy this condition.
An analogous conclusion can be drawn with regard to e¢ ciency condition (50) and the implication
that ￿f + ￿h < 0 is required to satisfy this condition. Therefore, e¢ ciency in this setting requires
that trade be subsidized.36
We may now con￿rm that the Nash tari⁄ choices are indeed ine¢ cient. This can be seen by
adding the bottom Nash condition in (45) to the top Nash condition in (47) and the top Nash
condition in (45) to the bottom Nash condition in (47) to obtain
[Vp￿






































and that (44) implies Vp￿w = E and V ￿






d￿f are positive, and so






d￿￿ and [Vpf +V ￿
pf]
dpf
d￿ must be negative when evaluated at
Nash tari⁄ choices. But then (49) implies that ￿￿ ￿and hence the sum of the Nash tari⁄s on home
exports to foreign ￿is above that required for e¢ ciency for any given ￿, while (50) implies that ￿ ￿
and hence the sum of the Nash tari⁄s on home imports from foreign ￿is above that required for
e¢ ciency for any given ￿￿.37
3.4 Politically Optimal Policies and E¢ ciency
To determine the reason for the ine¢ ciency of the Nash tari⁄ choices, we again follow Bagwell and
Staiger (1999, 2001) and de￿ne politically optimal tari⁄s as those tari⁄s that would hypothetically
36The reason that it is e¢ cient to subsidize to trade is that monopolistically competitive producers set prices above
marginal cost, and so e¢ ciency is served by subsidizing consumption of the di⁄erentiated goods, something that an
import subsidy in each country can - in a second-best fashion - achieve (see Helpman and Krugman, 1989, Ch. 7 for
a related discussion).
37In particular, beginning from the Nash equilibrium tari⁄ levels, a reduction in ￿
￿ will increase joint welfare and
move countries toward the international e¢ ciency frontier. A similar interpretation applies for (53) and (50) and the
Nash level of ￿.
32be chosen by governments unilaterally if they did not value the pure international rent-shifting
associated with the terms-of-trade movements induced by their unilateral tari⁄choices. Speci￿cally,
we suppose that the home government acts as if Vpw ￿ 0 and Vp￿w ￿ 0 when choosing its politically
optimal tari⁄, while the foreign government acts as if V ￿
pw ￿ 0 and V ￿
p￿w ￿ 0. Of course, we have
already noted that in the special environment we consider here, the home government has no ability
to alter p￿w with its tari⁄ choices while the foreign government has no ability to alter pw with its
tari⁄ choices, but for completeness and consistency with our earlier discussions we assume that
governments do not value any world price movements in the political optimum.





















But it is now immediate that the top conditions of (54) and (55) together imply (49), while the
bottom conditions of (54) and (55) together imply (50). Hence, politically optimal tari⁄s are
e¢ cient: if governments could be induced not to value the pure international rent-shifting associated
with the terms-of-trade movements induced by their tari⁄choices, they would set e¢ cient tari⁄s and
there would be nothing left for a trade agreement to do. Evidently, as in the Cournot delocation
model of the previous section, the ￿rm-delocation motive for trade-policy intervention provides
no independent source of international ine¢ ciency in the monopolistic competition model of ￿rm
delocation.
Again it is interesting to compare the conditions for politically optimal trade policies (54) and
(55) with the Nash conditions (45) and (47). Notice ￿rst that the Nash import tari⁄s for each
country are de￿ned by the same conditions as the conditions that de￿ne their politically optimal
import tari⁄s. This follows from the special feature of this model which, as we have noted, ensures
that import tari⁄s have no terms-of-trade e⁄ects. On the other hand, as we have observed, export
taxes do have terms-of-trade e⁄ects in this setting, and these e⁄ects account for the di⁄erence
between the Nash export policy conditions and the politically optimal export policy conditions.
In particular, as a comparison of the bottom condition in (45) with the top condition in (54)




home government is induced by its politically optimal condition to select a lower value of ￿￿
h than
it would were its selection determined by its Nash condition. An analogous statement applies to
the export policy of the foreign government.
Intuitively, in the Nash equilibrium governments use import tari⁄s in this model for the sole
33purpose of delocating ￿rms from the markets of their trading partners to their own market and
thereby lowering their own price index; an additional impact arises as the trade volume of the ￿rms
that remain located in their trading partners is reduced; and as we have already noted, there is no
terms of trade impact of import tari⁄s in the model. But governments also use export policies, and
here there is an o⁄setting incentive: an export subsidy could similarly help to delocate ￿rms; but an
export tax is warranted for terms-of-trade purposes in this model; and this terms-of-trade motive
keeps export subsidies lower than they would otherwise be. Notice, though, that an export subsidy
could be set so as to neutralize delocation that might otherwise occur as a result of the import tari⁄
of a trading partner, and it could also be set so as to neutralize any trade volume reduction for
surviving ￿rms that might have been caused by the trading partner￿ s import tari⁄. When a country
does not value the terms-of-trade consequences of its export policies, it is induced to increase its
export subsidies to exactly these neutralizing levels, and as a consequence the associated politically
optimal policy choices are e¢ cient.
Notice again the importance of export policies for this result. If governments were assumed
only to have import tari⁄s (￿h for the domestic government, ￿￿
f for the foreign government), then it
is still the case that e¢ ciency would be de￿ned as in (49) and (50) above, owing to the redundancy
of the instruments ￿h and ￿f and the instruments ￿￿
f and ￿￿
h in terms of their impacts on p￿
h
and pf. But as can be seen from the conditions for the political optimum (54) and (55), the
politically optimal setting of ￿h and ￿￿
f alone could not achieve e¢ ciency; indeed, given that there
are no terms-of-trade consequences associated with the setting of import tari⁄s in this model, the
politically optimal setting of ￿h and ￿￿
f corresponds to Nash choices. Hence, if export policies are
ruled out in this model, the Nash import tari⁄ choices are ine¢ cient, despite the fact that import
tari⁄s have no terms-of-trade consequences in the model; as a result, there is then a non-terms-of-
trade problem for a trade agreement to solve. But viewed in this way, it is also now clear what the
non-terms-of-trade problem is: a trade agreement can here help substitute for missing trade policy
instruments (export policies) which, if available, would then convert the role of a trade agreement
back to the standard terms-of-trade driven Prisoners￿Dilemma.
Therefore, as before, the e¢ ciency of the political optimum ￿and hence the ability to interpret
the problem that a trade agreement can solve as a terms-of-trade problem ￿hinges importantly on
the assumption that governments have su¢ cient trade-tax instruments at their disposal. If they
did not, then other non-terms-of-trade problems might also be addressed by a trade agreement (in
this setting, just as more generally).38
We summarize the results of this section with
Proposition 2 In the monopolistic competition model of ￿rm delocation, the Nash trade policies
are ine¢ cient, and the ine¢ ciency arises only because governments value the pure international
rent-shifting associated with the terms-of-trade movements induced by their unilateral tari⁄ choices.
38As with Proposition 1, we emphasize here that what is required for the e¢ ciency of the political optimum in
this setting is that each country has a complete set of trade tax instruments, in the sense that each government has
available the use of an import tari⁄ and an export tax/subsidy, not that each country has a complete set of (trade
and domestic) tax instruments with which to achieve the ￿rst best.
34In a recent paper, Ossa (2009) uses a monopolistic competition model of ￿rm delocation and
attempts to provide new answers relative to the terms-of-trade theory to two central questions in
the economics of trade agreements: ￿rst, what is the purpose of a trade agreement?; and second,
what is the role played by reciprocity and non-discrimination? Regarding the ￿rst question, Ossa
observes that the ￿rm-delocation externality can provide a separate reason for a trade agreement
that is independent of the terms-of-trade externality. Regarding the second question, Ossa then
o⁄ers a novel interpretation of reciprocity and non-discrimination as simple rules that can neutralize
the ￿rm-delocation externality. The result stated in Proposition 2 above is at odds with Ossa￿ s
￿rst observation, and so it is important to explore the di⁄erences across the two papers.
There are two substantive di⁄erences between the model employed by Ossa (2009) and the one
we develop in this section. A ￿rst di⁄erence is that Ossa follows Venables (1987) and adopts a
speci￿cation of utility that allows income e⁄ects on the demand for di⁄erentiated products, while
we follow Helpman and Krugman (1989) and adopt the (quasi linear) speci￿cation of utility in (28)
that ensures that there will be no such income e⁄ects. So along this dimension, Ossa￿ s model is
more general than the model we work with in this section. The second di⁄erence is related to the
￿rst: due to income e⁄ects, Ossa￿ s model is di¢ cult to work with when trade taxes imply revenue,
and so Ossa assumes for simplicity that trade taxes do not have revenue consequences. Importantly,
this assumption requires Ossa to abstract from export policies in his analysis, and focus only on
the use of import tari⁄s. By contrast, the revenue consequences of trade taxes are simple to handle
in our quasi-linear setting, because they are soaked up by consumption of the numeraire good, and
so we can and do allow for both import tari⁄s and export taxes; and as we have emphasized above,
allowing for a full set of trade policies is crucial for our result.
3.5 Reciprocity
As with the Cournot model of the previous section, an important implication of Proposition 2
is that, for the monopolistically competitive ￿rm delocation model, just as in the competitive
benchmark model, a trade agreement that is founded on the principle of reciprocity can guide
governments from their ine¢ cient unilateral policies to the e¢ ciency frontier. To establish this, we
again follow Bagwell and Staiger (2001) and de￿ne tari⁄ changes that conform to reciprocity as
those that bring about equal changes in the volume of each country￿ s imports and exports when
valued at existing world prices.
Again taking account of trade in the numeraire good, and letting a superscript ￿0￿ denote
original trade tax levels and a superscript ￿1￿denote new trade tax levels, it is direct to establish











39Once again the steps to derive (56) employ the balanced trade condition that must hold at the original and the
new world prices, and are identical to those described in note 19 of Bagwell and Staiger (2001).
35As was the case in the previous section, it is clear that there can be no pure international rent
shifting across countries as a result of tari⁄ changes that conform to reciprocity: according to (56),
such tari⁄ changes imply either that (i) world prices are left unchanged as a result of the tari⁄
changes, so that pw(￿0
f) = pw(￿1
f) and p￿w(￿￿0
h ) = p￿w(￿￿1
h ), or (ii) world prices are altered in a
net-trade￿ tax-revenue neutral fashion.
We are now prepared to interpret and evaluate the principle of reciprocity in the monopolistic
competition model of ￿rm delocation. As in the previous section, we proceed in two steps.
As a ￿rst step, it is straightforward to establish that, starting at the Nash equilibrium, the
home and foreign countries must both gain from a small adjustment in trade taxes that reduces
total trade barriers (￿ and ￿￿, and hence by (39) and (41), pf and p￿
h) and satis￿es reciprocity.
Consider ￿rst a reduction in ￿ and ￿￿ that is engineered with a small reduction in the home and
foreign import tari⁄s ￿h and ￿￿
f. As we have observed, the special features of this model imply that
import tari⁄s have no impacts on world prices, and so by (56) any reductions in ￿h and ￿￿
f will
conform to reciprocity in this model.40 But then, evaluated at the Nash conditions given by (45)




























































With analogous arguments, it can be shown that both countries gain from a small reduction
in ￿ and ￿￿ that is engineered with reciprocal reductions in the home and foreign export taxes ￿￿
h
and ￿f from their Nash levels. In particular, it follows from (56) that the reduction in ￿f that is
required to satisfy reciprocity in response to a small reduction in ￿￿












where M0 and E0 denote the initial levels of home-country imports and exports, respectively.41
But then, evaluated at the Nash conditions given by (45) and (47) and using (57), the impact on
home and foreign welfare of a small reciprocal reduction in ￿￿
























































40Intuitively, this simply re￿ ects the fact that in this model each country is ￿small￿with regard to its import tari⁄,
and for a small country a change in its trade policy must lead to equal changes in the volume of its imports and
exports by the condition that trade must remain balanced at the (￿xed) world prices.
41The expression in (57) may be derived in the same way as (56) by considering small tari⁄ changes and dropping
second-order terms, and using
dpw





36Our second step is to consider the impact of reciprocity when it is applied in response to the
reintroduction of trade barriers. Speci￿cally, we now establish that, if countries negotiate to the
political optimum, then neither country has an interest in unilaterally raising its import tari⁄ or
export tax if it is understood that such an act would be met with a reciprocal action from its trading
partner. To con￿rm this observation, let us begin at the politically optimal policies de￿ned by (54)
and (55). Clearly, neither country has any incentive to raise its import tari⁄ above its politically
optimal level, because as (45) and (47) con￿rm the condition that de￿nes the politically optimal
level of each country￿ s import tari⁄ is the same as that which de￿nes its Nash level (and as we
have observed, no policy response from the trading partner is warranted to maintain reciprocity in
this case). Consider next export policies. If the home country were to raise ￿￿
h beginning from the













































= ^ p =
dpw
d￿f , and the second equality follows
according to the conditions for the home-country￿ s politically optimal tari⁄ choices given in (54).
An exactly analogous argument holds for the foreign country￿ s incentive to raise ￿f in the face of
a reciprocal response from the home country.
Hence, the terms-of-trade Prisoners￿Dilemma problem that characterizes the Nash ine¢ ciency
in the monopolistically competitive delocation model ￿like the Cournot delocation model of the
previous section and like the competitive benchmark model ￿provides a foundation for understand-
ing why a trade agreement that is founded on the principle of reciprocity can guide governments
from their ine¢ cient unilateral policies to the e¢ ciency frontier. We summarize this discussion as
follows:
Corollary 2 In the monopolistic competition model of ￿rm delocation, the principle of reciprocity
serves to ￿undo￿the terms-of-trade driven ine¢ ciency that occurs when governments pursue uni-
lateral trade policies.
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that, unlike the Cournot delocation model, the monopolistic
competition model of ￿rm delocation presented in this section shares with the broader terms-of-
trade theory the prediction that trade agreements should encourage rather than discourage the use
of export subsidies. Evidently, a prediction that a trade agreement should restrict export subsidies
with a ceiling rather than a ￿ oor arises naturally when the terms-of-trade consequences of export
subsidies are reversed from the standard case, and this reversal occurs in the Cournot delocation
model but not in the monopolistic competition model of ￿rm delocation.
374 Conclusion
When markets are imperfectly competitive, pro￿t-shifting and ￿rm-delocation e⁄ects can give rise
to novel motives for trade policy intervention. In light of the various ways that trade policies
may in￿ uence welfare, it might be expected that new rationales for trade agreements would arise
once imperfectly competitive markets are allowed. In this paper, we feature the ￿rm-delocation
motive for trade policy intervention and argue that the basic rationale for a trade agreement is,
in fact, the same rationale that arises in perfectly competitive markets. In both the Cournot and
monopolistically competitive models of ￿rm delocation, the only rationale for a trade agreement is
to remedy the ine¢ ciency attributable to the terms-of-trade externality. Furthermore, and again
as in the benchmark model with perfect competition, we show that the principle of reciprocity is
e¢ ciency enhancing, as it serves to ￿undo￿the terms-of-trade driven ine¢ ciency that occurs when
governments pursue unilateral trade policies.
Our analysis thus suggests that the broad implications of the terms-of-trade approach to trade
agreements are quite general, as they apply not just to perfectly competitive but also to a wide
range of imperfectly competitive markets. This suggestion is further supported in our companion
paper (Bagwell and Staiger, 2009), which draws analogous conclusions in an imperfectly compet-
itive setting where the number of ￿rms is ￿xed and pro￿t-shifting e⁄ects are featured. With this
suggestion we do not mean to imply that extending the analysis of trade agreements to imperfectly
competitive markets is unimportant. On the contrary, as Ossa (2009) emphasizes, such work is crit-
ical for extending the applicability of the trade agreements literature to better re￿ ect the realities
of international trading patterns. In addition, novel insights emerge once we move outside of the
setting of perfect competition; for example, as we argue in Bagwell and Staiger (2009a), the novel
implications of the Cournot delocation model for export policies provides a new way of understand-
ing export subsidy agreements. Rather, our point is simply that the terms-of-trade approach to
trade agreements remains valid in imperfectly competitive settings as the foundation from which
to evaluate and interpret the design of trade agreements in light of the underlying problems that
they exist to solve.
Finally, in all of the settings that we consider the international externalities share an important
trait: they all travel through prices, and are hence pecuniary in nature. Of increasing urgency in
the world economy are problems ￿such as global warming ￿that feature international externalities
that take a non-pecuniary form. An important task for future research is to characterize the
form that an e¢ ciency-enhancing agreement might take when the underlying problems stem from
non-pecuniary externalities.42
42An additional feature which is common to all of the settings we consider is that international prices and the
quantities traded are determined by market-clearing mechanisms between (possibly non-competitive) suppliers and
consumers. Antras and Staiger (2008) show that, when trade re￿ ects specialized products whose international prices
are determined through bilateral bargaining between sellers and buyers rather than market clearing mechanisms, the
role of a trade agreement must expand beyond providing an avenue of escape from a terms-of-trade driven Prisoners￿
Dilemma if governments are to achieve the international e¢ ciency frontier.
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Firm Delocation in the Cournot Model
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